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vForeword
In November 2016, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), and national partner, the Beijing Normal University, Department of 
Social Policy shared the findings of this ADB and ILO joint study on Promoting Gender 
Equality in the Labor Market: Women, Work, and Migration in the People’s Republic of China at a 
national workshop. We would like to extend our thanks to Professor Xu Yuebin and his team 
at the Beijing Normal University for hosting this workshop and enabling the findings of the 
study to be shared with a wide range of stakeholders.
The background to this joint study is an increasing international body of literature that 
clearly demonstrates that gender equality is not just an equity issue; it inhibits progress  
for national economies as well as individual women (and men). The 2016 ADB study,  
“A Model of Gender Inequality and Economic Growth”, models the significant economic 
benefits of removing gender inequality in regional economies. The study estimated that per 
capita income would rise by 30.6% after one generation, and 71.1% after two, by improving 
women’s and girls’ time use allocation, promoting education and training, and increasing 
women’s labor market participation.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made significant advances in narrowing gender 
gaps in its labor market. It has one of the highest female labor force participation rates 
in the Asia and Pacific region, at around 64% in 2013, and one of the narrowest earnings 
gender gaps. The PRC has recognized the importance of gender equality in the labor market 
in its 5-year development plans, the recent White Paper on Gender Equality, specific 
legislation, and government machinery to implement specific policies and regulations. 
It has also been at the forefront in Asia of passing good legislation to promote women’s 
equality. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Women’s Rights 
and Interests, which clearly prohibits gender discrimination in employment, was passed 
some 25 years ago. The PRC ratified the relevant fundamental labor standards more 
than a decade ago: the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) in 1990, and the 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) in 2006.
The PRC is committed to the “new” Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which 
contain a stand-alone goal on gender equality, SDG 5, and specific actions and targets 
for promoting gender equality in the labor market. SDG Goal 8 is very clear: by 2030, it 
seeks to achieve “full and productive employment and decent work for all women and 
men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for equal 
work of equal value.” SDG 8 commits countries to “protect labor rights and promote safe 
and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular 
women migrants, and those in precarious employment.” Together, these SDGs seek to 
ensure gender equality in employment and, in particular, the protection and promotion of 
the rights of women migrant workers.
Gender Equality and the Labor Marketvi
This study looks beneath the surface of these considerable gains, to investigate how 
women are faring in the transition to the PRC’s new growth model, and what can be done 
to promote their participation. It shows how the PRC is undergoing multiple transitions, 
with complex implications for gender equality and work. It demonstrates how each of the 
four transitions: market, structural, growth, and demographic, has had an impact on the 
labor market, and provides evidence of areas where gender inequality remains, and where 
this inequality is increasing. For example, during the market transition, gender wage gaps 
and gender wage discrimination increased, reaching 33% in urban areas and 44% in rural 
areas. The structural transition from agriculture to industry and services was accompanied 
by a very large rural to urban migration, generating 274 million migrants in 2014 (some 34% 
of the economically active population). Women comprised about a third of the migrants. 
The interaction of gender norms and the hukou system produced gendered migration 
patterns that reflect who migrates, motivations, and outcomes. The study also highlights 
the particular challenges facing women migrant workers. They tend to be at the bottom 
rung of the economic ladder, with higher rates of vulnerable employment, lower earnings 
than men migrants, and less social protection. They are less able to pursue occupational 
advancement, and they endure poorer working conditions. Migrant mothers face further 
challenges in combining paid and unpaid work, and, like nonmigrant women workers, 
endure a “motherhood penalty” if they have young children. Some of the recommendations 
emanating from this ADB and ILO joint study include: rethinking the provision of care for 
a rapidly aging population so the burden is shared more equally between men and women, 
adopting measures to address sex segregation in the labor force, addressing gender wage 
discrimination, expanding protections for workers that will benefit women, systematically 
collecting and publishing sex-disaggregated data, and undertaking specific research studies 
to address gaps in the literature.
We hope that this study and its recommendations will provide useful inputs into this 
important reform agenda.
Benedict Bingham
Country Director 
People’s Republic of China Resident Mission
Asian Development Bank
Tim De Meyer
Country Director
ILO Country Office  for China and Mongolia
International Labour Organization
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Executive Summary
This report provides a high-level overview of women’s employment and gender equality in the labor market in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the question, 
“How have women been affected by development transitions over the course of the past 
three and a half decades of economic reform?” may seem straightforward, the answer is 
complicated. This is because women are not a homogenous group: they differ by age and 
education; by the household registration system (hukou) status, and as a result of their 
unpaid work activities as grandmothers, mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters. Further, 
women work in many different sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing, services, and 
the private, state, and informal sectors. In addition to these differences, this report studies 
not simply women in isolation, but also gender relations. 
To analyze this complexity, the report breaks down the PRC’s recent history into four 
separate but interconnected development transitions, each with its own logic and 
impact. An overview is provided of how these transitions—market, structural, growth, 
and demographic—had gendered impact on work. Gender equality in the labor market 
is analyzed in terms of equality of opportunity (e.g., participation) and treatment (e.g., 
benefits such as wages and social protection).
These impacts are conditioned by, or mediated through, a set of societal factors. These 
include gender norms, meaning the gendered values, beliefs, and attitudes affecting roles, 
behavior, work, and resources. These gender norms ascribe different roles to women and 
men in the household, workplace, and society. Of course, these are not static, as attitudes 
and values change over time. Gender norms also operate beyond the household, often 
in invisible ways, and structure public institutions and systems, including the hukou, laws, 
policies, and services. These norms affect how women and men are incorporated into the 
labor market, how much and what forms of human capital they bring with them, hiring and 
promotion decisions, the legal protections they receive, and the state services they can 
use. The impact of the transitions is also conditioned by voice—the ability of labor market 
participants to protect and advance their interests—individually and collectively.
The importance of gender equality in the labor market is recognized by the PRC as 
evident in its 5-year development plans, the recent White Paper on Gender Equality, 
specific legislations, and government machinery to implement specific policies and 
regulations. Gender equality is now widely acknowledged by economists and international 
development partner agencies as a human right and a determinant of productivity, and for 
its contribution to improvements in overall equality and economic growth.
To analyze this 
complexity, the report 
breaks down the 
PRC’s recent history 
into four separate 
but interconnected 
development transitions, 
each with its own logic 
and impact. An overview 
is provided of how these 
transitions—market, 
structural, growth, and 
demographic— 
had gendered impact  
on work.
Gender Equality and the Labor Marketx
Notwithstanding the commitments to gender equality made by the PRC, this report argues 
that the multiple transitions had significant impacts on gender equality in the labor market. 
The report demonstrates that pervasive and increasing gender inequalities in the labor 
market remain, caused by four interacting transitions. Therefore, these transitions require 
effective policy intervention if labor market outcomes are to match stated gender equality 
commitments.
The market transition, initiated in 1978 and ongoing, is characterized by features such 
as the decline in importance of state-owned enterprises in urban areas, and a shift to 
the household responsibility system in rural areas. One of the key changes in urban areas 
was the shift away from administrative mechanisms for employment and wage setting to 
market mechanisms. In addition, as production and employment shifted into the private 
sector, state and private sector employer-provided care services for children and the 
elderly declined. In rural areas, women’s access to wage employment changed and so did 
their access to other resources, such as land, particularly as the duration of land leases 
lengthened.
These changes were mediated through a greater role for gender norms in structuring and 
rewarding work in all sectors, and gaps in implementing laws. In rural areas, women had 
less access to off-farm employment than men. There is a gender gap in urban areas, with 
women more likely to be in informal employment and less likely to be entrepreneurs.
Gender wage gaps and gender wage discrimination increased as a result of the market 
transition. The gender wage gap reached 33% in urban areas and 44% in rural areas. Over 
90% of these gaps were estimated to be due to gender wage discrimination. The smaller 
role for state-owned enterprises and the general decline in the provision of care services, 
which are features of the market transition, contributed to the increased “motherhood” or 
“caregiving” wage penalty, estimated to be 37%.
The structural transition started in the 1950s, and intensified in the 1990s with migration. 
The structural transition refers to shifts in shares of national production away from the 
primary or agriculture sector toward the secondary and tertiary sectors (industry and 
services). The structural transition is associated with the export-led development strategy 
that increased demand for labor in manufacturing in coastal provinces.
While the structural transition affected both men and women, the shift in employment 
to the secondary sector was greater for men than women. Thus, the (lowest productivity) 
primary sector accounts for a greater share of women’s employment than men’s 
employment. The shift into the secondary sector was accompanied by industrial gender 
segregation, with women concentrated in the lowest-paid industrial sectors. For example, 
in the manufacturing sector, in textiles and apparel, where women comprise 67% of the 
workforce, wages are only 81% of the sector average.
The structural transition from agriculture to industry and services was facilitated by  
rural–urban migration—one of the most important features of the PRC’s labor market over 
the past 2 decades. According to national statistics, there were 274 million migrants in 
2014 (34% of the economically active population). While women comprise about a third 
of all migrants, there is gender parity among young migrants—equal numbers of young 
The market transition, 
initiated in 1978 
and ongoing, is 
characterized by 
features such as the 
decline in importance 
of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs)
The structural 
transition started 
in the 1950s, and 
intensified in the 1990s 
with migration. The 
structural transition 
refers to shifts in shares 
of national production 
away from the primary 
or agriculture sector 
toward the secondary 
and tertiary sectors.
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women and young men migrate. Due to the hukou system, rual–urban migration tends to 
be temporary or circular, since people with a rural hukou are constrained in accessing health 
care and education services for their children in urban areas. Thus, gender norms interact 
with the hukou system to determine gendered patterns of migration. Motivations for 
migrating and returning are gendered, with women more likely than men to migrate to earn 
money to support the family and to return to fulfill unpaid care responsibilities. 
Women migrant workers are at the bottom of the ladder, as they have higher rates of 
vulnerable employment, earn less than men migrants, have less social protection coverage, 
face a glass ceiling that prevents occupational advancement, and endure poor working 
conditions (including in the “dormitory labor regime”). Migrant mothers are especially 
challenged in combining paid and unpaid work. 
Despite the changes in the attitude and behavior of second-generation women migrant 
workers, their relative position has not improved in many respects. Their wages have 
increased (along with wages generally, including minimum wage increases), but rural migrant 
women’s wages have not increased to the same extent as those of other groups. Technological 
upgrading in the manufacturing sector and the movement inland of manufacturing 
enterprises have ambiguous impacts on gender equality in the labor market. While being 
closer to home may make it easier to resolve paid and unpaid work issues, working conditions 
may deteriorate and women may have less access to higher-skilled manufacturing jobs. The 
impact of out-migration is significant in rural areas, and it is gendered, with greater increases 
in work time for elderly women and girls than for elderly men and boys. 
The growth transition refers to the shift in policy toward less reliance on export-led 
growth and a greater role for domestic demand-led growth. This has been a policy drive 
since the early years of the first decade of the 2000s but recently has been more strongly 
emphasized. This transition is marked by a rise in service sector employment.
There is considerable sex segregation within the service sector and women are 
disproportionately located in low-wage sectors, including hotels and catering services, retail 
trade, and domestic services. The service sector also often involves work that is gendered 
because it draws on, or reinforces, gender norms and stereotypes about women and men. 
Age, physical appearance, and residency status all play roles in determining where women 
can work and, therefore constrain choice, equality of opportunity, and efficient labor 
market operation. In many service sectors, it is harder to monitor and enforce labor laws 
and regulations, and some service sectors lie outside labor law altogether; this is particularly 
important for women. 
Some female-dominated service sectors face especially high decent work deficits, including 
the lack of social protection and voice. For example, most of the estimated 20 million 
domestic service workers in the PRC are female rural migrant workers. Conditions of work 
often involve low pay, long working hours, no additional overtime pay, exposure to physical 
risk, isolation, and the lack of a collective voice.
The PRC experienced a demographic transition over the past 30 years that in most 
industrialized countries took over a hundred years to complete. The PRC’s population 
is rapidly aging, and there is a significant shift underway in the elderly dependency rate. 
The growth transition 
refers to the shift in 
policy toward less 
reliance on export-led 
growth and a greater role 
for domestic demand-
led growth.
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Over the past 15 years, the elderly dependency rate increased by about 40%, while the 
child dependency rate fell by 14%. In 2010, there were 178 million people in the PRC ages 
60 and over. The United Nations expects this number to increase to 340 million by 2030 
(accounting for 24% of the population), and to 440 million by 2050. 
This demographic transition has implications for not only labor force participation and 
employment, but also the potential shift between paid and unpaid work necessary to 
provide care for the aging population. The increased demand for eldercare is likely to be 
met predominantly by women. Gender norms have assigned girls and women greater 
responsibility for unpaid domestic work, and have clearly affected behavior and work time: 
women take on 85% of household chores, women are more likely than men to provide 
eldercare, women in both rural and urban areas spend on average from two to three times 
more hours per week performing housework than men, and the gender gap in unpaid work 
time is 2 hours and 24 minutes per day. 
The demographic transition, in the context of decreased state support for care, is likely  
to increase women’s unpaid work burden, intensify their paid–unpaid work conflicts,  
and reduce their labor force participation rate. It is also likely to lead an expansion of 
female-dominated paid care employment, which is characterized by low pay and poor 
working conditions.
The transition framework highlights some of the drivers of the gendered labor market and 
gender inequality, and these transitions often interact and may be mutually enforcing. For 
example, market reforms and gender wage discrimination interact with the demographic 
transition to reinforce gender inequality. The result is continuing pervasive gender labor 
market inequality, with many indicators showing a worsening trend. This means that broad-
based policy interventions are needed to address inequality and to deliver stated goals. 
This report recommends six key areas: (i) reduce industrial and occupational gender 
segregation, (ii) address gender wage discrimination, (iii) promote and expand decent 
work, (iv) promote women’s entrepreneurship, (v) rethink the provision of care, and (vi) fill 
gender knowledge gaps. 
… the gender gap  
in unpaid work time 
is 2 hours and  
24 minutes per day
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1The remarkable economic growth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past 3 decades resulted in an increase in per capita income from $330 in 1990 to $7,380 in 
2014,1 and a fall in the poverty headcount from 67% in 1990 to 11% in 2010.2 Behind these 
figures is an economic transformation, as the PRC became the world’s largest exporter of 
goods; the value of exports (with 2000 as the base year of 100) increased from 25 in 1990 
to 887 in 2013.3 It is well documented that income inequality increased substantially during 
the economic reform period because the benefits of growth were unequally distributed. 
One measure of rising income inequality, the income share of the lowest 20%, fell from 
8.0% in 1990 to 4.7% in 2010 (footnote 3). Who benefits from this growth depends on the 
nature of the economic transformation and on the social, institutional, and policy contexts 
within which it takes place.
The PRC’s economic growth is based on a series of transitions, each impacting the labor 
market. There has been a major change in the economic system from a planned to a market 
economy. This market transition, which started in 1978, included the rise of the private 
sector and the decline of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), offering new opportunities 
but also increasing vulnerability for workers. The second transition, involving shifts in 
the structure of the economy, has been ongoing for several decades. This structural 
transition moved the PRC from a primarily agricultural economy to an industrial economy, 
and involved an accompanying shift of employment from agriculture to manufacturing, 
including the vast transfer of labor from rural to urban areas to provide labor for expanding 
coastal manufacturing industries and cities. This industrial shift was most recently 
accompanied by a technological transition as Chinese enterprises attempted to move up 
the value chain. The third transition, a policy change beginning in the first decade of the 
2000s, is toward a more balanced economic growth path, which relies more on domestic 
demand. This growth transition, by placing greater emphasis on domestic demand as a 
source of growth, may increase the role of services in the sector composition of output and 
employment. The fourth transition is a demographic one associated with the PRC’s rapidly 
aging population, partly a result of the one-child policy, which has implications not only for 
labor force participation and employment, but also for the potential shift in paid and unpaid 
work necessary to provide care for the aging population. 
1 Atlas method (current US dollars) (World Bank. World Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators).
2 Poverty headcount ratio (percentage of population) at $1.90 a day (2011 purchasing power parity) (World Bank. World 
Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators).
3 World Bank, World Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world 
-development-indicators
1 Introduction
The PRC’s economic 
growth is based on a 
series of transitions, 
each impacting the 
labor market.
Gender Equality and the Labor Market2
These multiple transitions and their associated labor market impacts require a gender 
analysis, since the labor market is permeated with gendered constraints resulting from 
competing burdens of paid and unpaid work, social norms affecting employment choices, 
and education levels. A gender analysis of labor markets is required to identify and 
document the impacts of the PRC’s multiple transitions.
Gender equality is both a human right and “smart economics”4 contributing to inclusive 
and balanced growth.5 Investing in women’s full economic potential is critical to increasing 
productivity and economic growth, and increasing industry’s ability to compete in global 
markets. Not doing so is an under-use of available human resources. Moreover, reducing 
gender barriers to decent employment is fundamental to advancing the inclusive growth 
agenda and optimizing the positive spin-off effects of increased income levels for women, 
and, therefore, their families, and communities. In other words, investing in gender equality 
plays a key role in harnessing domestic demand and rebalancing growth.6 
Gender equality in the labor market, following International Labour Organization 
conventions, requires both equality of opportunity and equality of treatment. “Equality 
of opportunity” refers to equal access for women and men to the labor market for overall 
employment, to jobs across the occupation and industry spectrum, and to education and 
training opportunities. Equality of treatment in the labor market requires nondiscrimination 
in remuneration, working conditions, and social protection.7 Improving gender equality 
in the labor market contributes to inclusive growth through increased productivity and 
improved resource allocation. Moving beyond economic growth, gender equality in the 
labor market may contribute to women’s economic empowerment.8
The commitment to gender equality is also evident in the PRC’s policy documents. 
For example, Chapter 66 of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) includes the 
provisions to “guarantee women’s equal rights and opportunities and access to education, 
employment, and marital property and participate in social affairs; protect rural women’s 
land rights and interests; and involve more women in decision-making and management.”9 
Commitment to gender equality is also expressed in the White Paper on Gender Equality 
and Women’s Development in China,10 which states: “Equal participation in economic 
activities and equitable access to economic resources are the basic conditions for the well-
being and development of women. While pressing forward with strategic adjustment of its 
economic structure and reform and innovation of its growth model, China fully protects 
the economic interests of women, promoting women’s equal participation in economic 
4 World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development. Washington, DC.
5 Asian Development Bank (ADB) and International Labour Organization (ILO). 2011. Women and Labor Markets in 
Asia. Rebalancing for Gender Equality. Bangkok.
6 ADB and ILO. 2013. Good Global Economic and Social Practices to Promote Gender Equality in the Labor Market. Manila; 
also footnote 5.
7 ILO. 2008. Work, Income and Gender Equality in East Asia: Action Guide. Bangkok.
8 N. Kabeer. 2012. Women’s Economic Empowerment and Inclusive Growth: Labor Markets and Enterprise 
Development. Social Innovation Generation. Working Paper 2012/1. International Development Research Centre and 
Department for International Development of the United Kingdom; for the PRC; and F. MacPhail and X. Dong. 2007. 
Market Labor and Women’s Status in the Household in Rural China: Implications for Gender Equity under the WTO. 
Feminist Economics. 13 (3–4). pp. 93–124.
9 ADB. Key New PRC Legislation Relevant to ADB Operations. Manila. p. 111.
10 State Council Information Office. 2015. White Paper on Gender Equality and Women’s Development in China. 
Beijing (p. 3). http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/09/22/content_281475195668448.htm. 
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development and equal access to the fruits of reform and development.” The PRC has 
implemented national institutions to promote the status of women, including the National 
Working Committee on Children and Women and support for the All China Women’s 
Federation. 
The purpose of this technical note is to identify at a high level the impact of four transitions 
in the Chinese economy on one of these goals: women’s, equal opportunities in, and access 
to, employment. Particular emphasis is given to migrant women’s employment. It concludes 
by identifying key issues requiring gender-responsive policies to ensure that women can 
participate equally in these transitions.11 
The following analysis is based on publicly available data and literature.12 The main data 
sources for employment trends and patterns are the China Statistical Yearbook 2015 of the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS),13 and the China Labour Statistical Yearbook (2004 and 
2014) of the NBS and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS).14 These 
are supplemented with appropriate data from other national sources and from international 
organizations. National data on migration flows by gender are not available in the, and 
the discussion of gendered migration employment issues draws primarily upon academic 
and international organization literature. Information about treatment in employment is 
drawn primarily from peer-reviewed publications and reports published by international 
organizations. 
It should be noted that data constraints limit the ability to provide a comprehensive picture 
of women’s work and gender equality in the labor market in the PRC in this report; sex-
disaggregated data is only available for some series. Urban data is more readily available 
than rural data. The limited data on rural employment by sex necessarily means this report 
contains only brief discussion of rural women’s employment, despite its significance in 
a complete analysis of gender and labor in the PRC. While urban data is more readily 
available, it is nevertheless uneven. The richest data available is for employees in “urban 
units,” defined as “those who work in (and receive income from) units with state ownership, 
urban collective ownership, joint ownership, shareholding stock ownership, limited liability 
corporations, foreign and Hong Kong, China; Macau, China; and Taipei,China fund or 
other ownership and their affiliated units.”15 As such, “urban units” exclude “urban private 
enterprises and individual units” and, thus, cannot be considered to cover all urban 
employment. The data on urban units captures only about 54% of total urban employment 
(footnote 15, and Table 1–7). Therefore, bear in mind when reading the report that the 
available data is limited. Collecting a wider range of sex-disaggregated variables beyond 
urban units would considerably enhance possibilities for future analysis. Finally, the report 
11 While the combination of transitions discussed is perhaps unique to the PRC, the drivers of gender inequality in 
the labor market have parallels with transitions occurring in other countries. A systematic comparison between the 
gendered processes and outcomes of these transitions in the PRC and elsewhere is beyond the scope of this report, 
which focuses on documenting and analyzing the PRC’s transitions.
12 Therefore, the report is limited by relying on existing data sources. No field surveys were conducted specifically for 
this report and statistical analysis of existing survey data has not been undertaken. This is consistent with the terms of 
reference for this report.
13 NBS. 2015. China Statistical Yearbook 2015. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
14 NBS and MHRSS. 2004. China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2004. Beijing: China Statistics Press; and NBS and MHRSS. 
2014. China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
15 Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators. NBS and MHRSS. 2014. China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2014. 
Beijing: China Statistics Press.
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focuses upon participation and benefit, two key aspects of economic empowerment. 
However, it offers a more limited analysis of a third dimension, namely, voice.
This report synthesizes evidence of trends in women’s employment in the context of the 
transitions identified above. The research is intended to strengthen the evidence basis for 
gender-inclusive and gender-sensitive projects, programs, policies, and laws in the context 
of a rapidly changing labor market undergoing multiple transitions. The report is planned 
to complement the following: the Asian Development Bank (ADB) technical assistance 
(TA) to the State Council on market reform, the ADB TA on Urban Poverty and Migrants, 
the ILO (2015) report on Women in the Labour Market in China, the forthcoming ILO China 
Labour Market Profile report, and ILO cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences on decent work indicators.16
This report argues that the multiple transitions impact upon gender equality in the labor 
market. It argues that pervasive and/or increasing gender inequalities remain in the labor 
market caused by the four interacting transitions. These transitions require effective policy 
intervention, if labor market outcomes are to match stated gender equality commitments.
To reach this conclusion, this report develops a framework that traces the impacts of 
the four transitions on gender equality in the labor market. Gender equality in the labor 
market is analyzed in terms of equality of opportunity (e.g., participation) and treatment 
(e.g., benefits in terms of wages and social protections).
These impacts are conditioned by, or mediated through, a set of societal factors. These 
include gender norms, which are the gendered values, beliefs, and attitudes affecting 
roles, behavior, work, and resources. These gender norms ascribe to women and men 
different roles in the household, the workplace, and society. Of course, they are not static 
because attitudes and values change over time. Gender norms also operate beyond the 
household, often in invisible ways, and structure public institutions and systems, including 
the traditional household status system (hukou), laws, policies, and services.17 These norms 
affect how women and men are incorporated into the labor market, how much and what 
forms of human capital they bring with them, hiring and promotion decisions, what legal 
protections they receive and what state services they can use. The impact of the transitions 
is also conditioned by voice—the ability of the labor market participants to protect and 
advance their interests—both individually and collectively.
The framework that guides this report is shown in Figure 1.
16 The concept of “decent work” covers a variety of employment characteristics, including adequate earnings and 
productive work, decent working time, stability and security of work, equal opportunity and treatment in employment, 
and social dialogue. For a complete list, with definitions and indicators, see ILO. 2012. Decent Work Indicators: Concepts 
and Definitions. Geneva.  
17 The hukou system was developed in the PRC during the 1950s, and assigned individuals an urban or rural residency 
status. This residency status (or hukou) provided the basis for deciding where individuals could work and the benefits 
to which they were entitled. The system was designed to limit urbanization and produced distinct spatial hierarchies. 
The migration of the reform period since 1978 has taken place within the same institutional framework, which has 
limited the rights of rural hukou holders in the urban centers where they now work. For a discussion of the origins and 
workings of the hukou system, see T. Cheng and M. Seldon. 1994. The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s 
Hukou System. The China Quarterly. 139. pp. 644–668.
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This framework will be used to analyze each of the four transitions identified in Sections 3–6. 
First, Section 2 provides an overview of some important gender norms and their outcomes 
and gender equality indexes, since these provide the context for all four transitions.  
 Source: Author.
Figure 1: Framework for Analyzing the Gendered Impacts  
of Transitions on Work and Gender Equality
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62  The People’s Republic of China 
Context: A Gendered Society
The PRC, like all countries, is a gendered society. The multiple dimensions of how gender structures and affects societies can be measured by “gender gaps.” Many international 
agencies and other organizations measure and publish these gender gaps as indicators of 
how societies are gendered, and as guides for areas where policy intervention is desirable. 
For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender-Related 
Development Index adjusts the Human Development Index (HDI) for gender inequality 
in the three dimensions covered by the HDI: life expectancy, education, and income. The 
UNDP Gender Inequality Index reflects inequality in achievement between women and 
men in the dimensions of reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market. The 
World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index also uses a broad range of indicators to capture 
gender gaps in economic participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, and 
educational attainment. These provide examples of the dimensions of gender differences 
within countries, and allow for points of comparison across countries.18
For reference, in 2014, the PRC was in “group 3” of the Gender-Related Development 
Index, which divides countries into five groups by absolute deviation from gender parity in 
HDI values (with group 1 having the least deviation). Therefore, the PRC falls in the middle 
category of countries as measured by the deviation from gender parity.19 The 2014 UNDP 
Gender Inequality Index ranks the PRC 40th of 188 countries (footnote 19, and Table 5,  
pp. 224–227). The Gender Gap Index for 2015 ranked the PRC 91st of 145 countries.20
These measures are useful for highlighting at a high level the multiple dimensions of 
gender inequality and form that gender differences can take. They are also useful in 
showing that the PRC has gender inequalities that need to be addressed if the United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal—achieve gender equality and empower all 
women and girls—is to be realized. The measures also demonstrate that the PRC’s ranking 
among countries varies considerably, depending upon which indicators are used in the 
construction of the index. This points to the need to be cautious in drawing inferences from 
any one or a few indicators. 
Nevertheless, a review of several indicators provides a good entry point to understanding 
the gendered nature of the PRC’s society, and can provide important background context 
for the gender analysis of the multiple transitions identified above.
18 For further discussion of these and other gender indicators, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/ 
43041409.pdf 
19 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2015. Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human 
Development. New York (Table 4, pp. 220–223).
20 http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/
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One of the main social manifestations of the gendered society in the PRC is the “preference 
for sons,” arising in large part from the social norm that sons are responsible for supporting 
parents in their old age.21 The result, when combined with the one-child policy, is a 
high male to female sex-ratio. In 1980, there were 106 boys under the age of 5 for every 
100 girls.22 However, as shown in Figure 2, by 2014, this ratio had risen to 117:100 for the 
same group. 
In addition to the imbalance in the sex ratio at young ages shown in Figure 2, girls have 
higher rates of juvenile mortality than boys, are more likely to be given up than boys, and 
adopted girls are more likely to be living in conditions akin to domestic servitude.23
21 C. To. 2014. Domestic Labor, Gendered Intergenerational Contract, and Shared Elderly Care in Rural South China.  
In Z. Hao and S. Chen, eds. Social Issues in China: Gender, Ethnicity, Labor and the Environment. New York: Springer  
(pp. 67–83).
22 ADB. 2014. Human Resource Transformation: The Role of Education in Moving the PRC to a Knowledge Society.  
Manila (p. 5).
23 ADB. 2015. Female Labor Force Participation in Asia: China Country Study. Manila (p. 22).
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 2–8).
Figure 2: Number of Males per 100 Females, 2014
0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00
0–4
5–9
10–14
15–19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–39
40–44
45–49
50–54
55–59
60–64
65–69
70–74
75–79
80–84
85–89
90–94
95+
Number of males per 100 females 
A
ge
 c
at
eg
or
y 
(y
ea
rs
)
Female Male
One of the main social 
manifestations of the 
gendered society in the 
PRC is the “preference 
for sons,” … 
Gender Equality and the Labor Market: Women, Work, and Migration in the People’s Republic of China8
The gendered society is also demonstrated in the different levels of educational attainment 
between men and women at the national level. Lower female levels of educational 
attainment are reflected in the lower levels of educational attainment among employed 
women. While education levels increased for both employed men and women in the past 
decade, the ILO24 notes that the largest gain in employment share for women was among 
those with a junior secondary level of education, whereas for men it was for those with a 
senior secondary level of education. The result was that “the overall education of employed 
men, therefore, tended to move toward a higher education profile than that of employed 
women” (footnote 24). The share of employed men with senior school education in 2003 
was 15.2%, and by 2013, had increased to 19.0% (Figure 3). Among employed women, the 
largest change occurred in junior secondary school education, where the share increased 
from 39.5% to 46.1% from 2003 to 2013 (Figure 3). More generally, the percentage of 
employed men with low levels of education is lower compared with employed women. In 
2013, 66.1% of employed men had junior school education or less, compared with 71.0% of 
employed women (Figure 3).
Despite these trends, gaps in enrollment rates from primary to tertiary education 
substantially narrowed between boys and girls over the past decade and, in some cases, 
girls now constitute the majority (footnote 23, p. 12). This closing gender gap in education 
24 ILO. 2015. Women in the Labour Market in China. ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series. Bangkok (p. 8).
Figure 3: Distribution of Employed Women and Men  
by Level of Education, 2003 and 2013
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The People’s Republic of China Context 9
levels, largely a result of policy,25 indicates that workforce educational attainment levels 
by gender should become more equal. Nevertheless, evidence from other countries 
shows that, despite women’s educational investments, occupational and industrial gender 
segregation persist, contributing to gender pay gaps, and limiting women’s access to higher 
level jobs.26 Such outcomes will be discussed for the PRC.
For paid work, the gendered society is also shown by women’s participation in the labor 
force being lower than men’s (Figure 4).
While the labor force participation rates for both women and men fell over the past 
15 years, the greater decline in women’s participation means that the gender gap in labor 
force participation rose, from 12.4 percentage points in 2000 to 14.4 percentage points by 
2013. Further, labor force participation is only one element, and the quality of work is even 
more important for gender equitable economic development. The gendered differences in 
job quality and decent work in particular sectors are discussed further below. 
25 The last decade has seen a concerted policy effort to ensure that 9 years of compulsory free education are available 
to all, including in rural areas. However, a significant quality gap exists in the education provided between rural and 
urban areas that continues to disadvantage rural residents. Rural schools have teachers with lower qualifications, lack 
specialist teachers, and receive lower funding per student than urban schools. S. McQuaide. 2009. Making Education 
Equitable in Rural China through Distance Learning. International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning.  
10 (1). pp. 1–21.
26 D. Grimshaw and J. Rubery. 2015. The Motherhood Pay Gap: A Review of the Issues, Theory, and International 
Evidence. Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 57. Geneva: International Labour Office (p. 718).
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1-34); and NBS and MHRSS. 2004. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2004. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1-47. pp. 2–8).
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While female labor force participation in the PRC fell over the past decade and the gender 
gap increased, the gender gap in labor force participation is not as pronounced in the PRC 
as in many other Asian countries. The female-to-male labor force participation ratio of 
82% in 2013 was substantially higher than that in Pakistan (30%), India (34%), Indonesia 
(61%), and the Republic of Korea (70%) (Table 1). The female labor force participation rate 
for the 15 years and older age group stands at 64%, and is comparable with levels found in 
North America and Northern Europe. Indeed, the PRC’s relatively high female labor force 
participation rate makes it an “outlier among middle-income countries” (footnote 23, 
p. 12). High women’s labor force participation rates have roots in the organization of the 
Source: International Labour Organization. Key Indicators of the Labour Market. 8th edition (Table 1a).  
http://www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/research-and-databases/kilm/lang--en/index.htm 
Figure 4: Labor Force Participation Rates (15 years and older) (%),  
Women and Men, 1990–2013 
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Table 1: Ratio of Labor Force Participation Rates (women to men),  
Selected Asian Countries, 1990 and 2013
People’s 
Republic of 
China Pakistan India
Republic of 
Korea Indonesia
2013 81.6 29.7 33.8 69.5 61.0
1990 85.7 15.8 40.9 64.2 61.9
Source: Asian Development Bank. Key New PRC Legislation Relevant to ADB Operations (no date, p. 6). 
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economy, together with an ideological commitment to women’s equality, following the 
1949 establishment of the PRC. The decline and the increasing gender gap in the labor 
force participation rate, particularly evident from around the start of the new millenium are 
discussed further below. 
For unpaid work, women in both rural and urban areas in the PRC spend on average two 
to three times more hours per week performing housework than men.27 In 2008, the 
gender gap in unpaid work time was 2 hours and 24 minutes per day.28 The organization of 
household and care work, the social norms that contribute to the gendering of that work, 
and the divisions between public and private provisions, condition women’s participation 
in the paid economy in the PRC as elsewhere. For asset ownership, men are nearly twice 
as likely as women to own real estate and nearly three times more likely to own a car than 
women (footnote 27, Chart 9–6).
The picture that emerges is that the PRC is a gendered society with an enduring social 
preference for sons. And yet, policy changes have been effective in achieving change in 
many areas, and point to the importance of continued policy development.29 For example, 
policy changes led to significant gains in female education levels, especially for the youngest 
age groups. Although female participation in the labor force is falling, and the gender gap 
in this indicator is increasing, it is still significantly higher than in other Asian countries. 
Attitudes are changing too. For example, in 2000, only 25.7% of respondents in a national 
survey agreed that daughters and sons should share equal rights to property inherited 
from their parents (provided they had fulfilled their obligation to support their parents). In 
2010, this increased to 76.3% (footnote 27, p. 131). Therefore, social norms are changing in 
some ways; they also differ between regions, urban and rural areas, and ethnicities. While 
much of the statistical economic data presented is national in scope, the social structures 
behind these numbers can differ; the PRC is a large country and regional variations in 
social structures and norms must be considered in identifying the need for, and design of, 
policy interventions.30 These findings point to a complex interaction of social norms, public 
institutions, and economic change. 
These complex interactions affect gender equality in the labor market in the PRC, and 
are analyzed separately for each of the four main major transitions in the economy. Three 
of the transitions are associated with the economic reform process—market, structural, 
and growth transitions—and the fourth is a demographic transition related to the aging 
population. Each of these transitions is examined below to analyze how women’s work  
is changing, where there have been gains for women, and where significant policy 
challenges remain. 
27 NBS. 2012. Women and Men in China: Facts and Figures 2012. Department of Social, Science and Technology and 
Cultural Statistics. Beijing (Chart 9–11).
28 X. Dong and X. An. 2015. Gender patterns and value of unpaid care work: findings from China’s first large-scale time 
use survey. Review of Income and Wealth. 61 (3). pp. 540–560.
29 For a review of the PRC’s policy development concerning women, see State Council Information Office (footnote 11).
30 R. Madsen provides a useful way of thinking about the PRC as comprising of “three systems” (rural, socialist, and newly 
industrializing), each with its own “distinctive internal stratification system, a distinctive pattern of life courses, and 
a distinctive set of cultural understandings.” Social norms concerning gender roles form one part of this. R. Madsen. 
2003. One Country, Three Systems: State-Society Relations in Post-Jiang China. In G. Lin and X. Hu, eds. China after 
Jiang. Stanford: Stanford University Press (p. 92). 
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Key Points
The People’s Republic of China (PRC), like all other societies, is gendered. The ways in which 
women and men experience society unequally are multidimensional. Depending on which 
dimensions are considered, the PRC ranks between the top quarter and the bottom two-fifths 
in global gender indexes.
The PRC has a large sex ratio imbalance and a persistent “son preference.”
While the female labor force participation rate (LFPR) is relatively high, the gender gap in the 
LFPR has been increasing over the past decade.
The education gap between employed women and employed men has been increasing in favor 
of the latter. The gender gap in school enrollment rates, however, is closing.
There is a large difference in the unpaid work burdens of women and men.
13
3 The Market Transition
3.1 General Features
The PRC’s transition from a planned to a market economy began in 1978 in rural areas, with the abolition of the commune system and the introduction of the household 
responsibility system. Market-oriented reforms were introduced into the urban industrial 
sector in 1985 and, since then, the economy has “grown out of the plan,”31 and the market 
transition was reinforced and accelerated after the PRC’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001.32 This transition was reflected in a steady decline in the 
share of industrial output produced in the SOEs and increases from other domestic “mixed 
ownership” forms such as some limited liability corporations and shareholding corporations, 
joint ventures, foreign-invested enterprises, and the private sector. This trend is expected 
to continue with the “supply-side structural reform” envisaged in the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan (2016–2020). Not only did the ownership structure change substantially, but the role 
of the market in allocating resources was progressively enhanced and, as announced at the 
Third Plenum in 2013, is now officially accorded the “decisive” role.33
In 2014, “pure” SOEs had assets worth approximately CNY6.7 trillion (although the state 
also had ownership stakes in other ownership types).34 The comparable figure for domestic 
private enterprises was CNY21.3 trillion, joint ventures CNY5.6 trillion, and foreign-funded 
enterprises CNY5.5 trillion (footnote 12, Table 13-1).
The composition of urban employment also changed. From 1994 to 2003, the absolute 
number of women and men employed in SOEs fell; and from 2003 to 2013 (after the 
initial and most dramatic reforms), the numbers remained roughly constant (Figure 5). 
However, the share of employment (women and men combined) accounted for by 
SOEs fell substantially as employment in the private sector expanded: the share of urban 
employment in SOEs fell from 62.7% to 35.1% from 2003 to 2013 (Figure 6). 
 
31 B. Naughton. 1996. Growing Out the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978–1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32 For analysis of the specific effects of WTO entry on labor market outcomes for women and men, see X. Dong, S. Li, 
and S. Yang. 2016. Trade Liberalization, Social Policy Development and Labour Market Outcomes of Chinese Women 
and Men in the Decade After China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization. Discussion Paper No.9. New York: 
UN Women (February).
33 Xinhua. 2013. Market to Play “Decisive” Role in Allocating Resources: Communique. http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/china/2013-11/12/c_132882172.htm (accessed 12 November 2016).
34 For discussion of the complex nature of ownership categories in the PRC, see M. Meyer and C. Wu. 2014. Making 
Ownership Matter: Prospects for China’s Mixed Ownership Economy. Paulson Policy Memorandum. Chicago: 
September. 
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 Sources: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Tables 1–8 and 1–15); and NBS and MHRSS. 2004. China 
Labour Statistical Yearbook 2004. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1–10).
Figure 5: Number Employed (million), by Enterprise Type,  
Urban Units, by Sex, Selected Years
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1–8).
Figure 6: Distribution of Employment (women and men combined)  
by Enterprise Registration Status (%), Urban Units, 2003 and 2013
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Two key features associated with the market transition are particularly important in 
understanding the gendered impact of the market transition on the labor market. First, 
the shift in employment from SOEs to the private sector means that administrative forms 
of employment and wage setting common in the planned era and used in the SOEs 
were replaced with market forms of employment and wage setting. Second, the shift in 
employment toward the private sector meant a decline in employer-provided care services 
for children and the elderly.35 
3.2 Women’s Employment and the  
Market Transition
As the ownership structure of enterprises changed, so did the distribution of women’s 
employment among enterprise types in urban areas. As might be expected, the percentage 
of women working in the state-owned sector decreased while the percentage working in 
the “other” category (private domestic, joint ventures, and foreign-invested enterprises) 
increased. For example, the share of women’s employment in SOEs declined from 60.7% 
to 39.0% from 2003 to 2013 (Figure 7). Total employment (women and men combined) 
declined from 62.7% to 35.1% (Figure 6). 
35 S. Cook and X. Dong. 2011. Harsh Choices: Chinese Women’s Paid Work and Unpaid Care Responsibilities under 
Economic Reform. Development and Change. 42 (4). pp. 947–965.
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1–8); and NBS and MHRSS. 2004. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2004. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1–10).
Figure 7: Distribution of Women’s Employment by Enterprise  
Registration Status (%), Urban Units, 2003 and 2013
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The number of women employed in the state-owned sector fell slightly over the past 
decade and the number of women employed in the “other” category tripled, from 
12.4 million to 36.9 million (Figure 5). 
The different ownership sectors are not necessarily organized and changing in the same ways 
when it comes to the operation of their labor markets and the gender dynamics evident in 
them. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the state and nonstate sectors separately to assess 
the impacts of the market transition on gender equality in the labor market. 
The market transition also affected the agricultural economy. In the initial stages, this 
meant the transition to the household responsibility system and the establishment of land 
leases. D. Hare, L. Yang, and D. Englander report that, in early rounds, when land leases 
were relatively short and land redistribution common, women were unlikely to be adversely 
affected by marriage; that is, when they moved to their husband’s household, it would receive 
additional land and their natal household would lose land in the next readjustment, because 
of the two households’ compositional change.36 Women were still typically disadvantaged 
because they were registered as the holder of the land rights, but they did retain access 
through land adjustment processes. As land tenure leases became longer in the late 1990s 
and continued in the wake of the WTO entry in 2001 (when efforts to increase agricultural 
efficiency through greater security of land use rights came to the fore), the frequency of 
land redistribution was much reduced. The result was that, when women married, their new 
household did not gain land while their natal household did not lose land but, in practice 
(although not in law), women were not able to reclaim it. This meant that women were 
disadvantaged in their new households by not having a source of land; widows and divorced 
women were also particularly disadvantaged. In this way, the new policies designed to 
increase the security of land rights paradoxically had the opposite impact on women’s land 
claims (footnote 36). This not only disadvantaged women economically, but evidence shows 
that women who lost claims to contract land are at higher risk of domestic violence.37 
At the same time, in the face of small farm sizes and low agricultural productivity, government 
policy in the agriculture sector attempted since the late 1990s to spur “modernization.” 
The aim was to increase production scale with a central mechanism being the “government 
promotion of so-called ‘dragon head’ agribusinesses.” These enterprises “supply urban 
markets through large-scale, rurally located agribusiness operations (e.g., in poultry, livestock, 
and food processing).”38 These enterprises facilitated the market transition in the rural PRC 
and contributed to the rise in wage labor, albeit within the context of collective land rights. 
This “led to a distinctive, and more egalitarian, form of agrarian capitalism than found in 
other developing countries.”39 However, there is no analysis from a gender perspective of 
how women, whether as contract farmers, traders, or employees, of the new agribusiness 
conglomerates have been affected. Who is being linked with these new firms and by what 
36 D. Hare, L. Yang, and D. Englander. 2007. Land Management in Rural China and Its Gender Implications. Feminist 
Economics. 13 (3–4). pp. 35–61.
37 Y. Song and X. Dong. Domestic Violence and Women’s Land Rights in Rural China: Findings from a National Survey in 
2010. Journal of Development Studies. (forthcoming).
38 X. Dong, P. Bowles, and H. Chang. 2010. Managing Liberalization and Globalization in Rural China: Trends in Rural 
Labor Allocation, Income, and Inequality. Global Labor Journal. 1 (1). p. 36.
39 See footnote 38 p. 27. See also Q. Zhang and J. Donaldson. 2008. The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism with Chinese 
Characteristics: Agricultural Modernization, Agribusiness, and Collective Land Rights. The China Journal. 60.  
pp. 25–47.
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methods, and who are the main beneficiaries, need to be analyzed from a gender perspective. 
This is an area where further research is needed so that the gender impacts of the market 
transition and agricultural modernization can be understood. 
3.3  Gender Equality in the Labor Market  
and the Market Transition 
3.3.1 Decline in Women’s Employment in State-Owned Enterprises 
The aggregate data presented above shows that women and men lost jobs in the SOE 
sector at around the same rates. However, more detailed studies based on specialized 
data sets reveal some important gender differences in both layoff and reemployment 
dynamics. For example, S. Appleton et al., using the 1999 Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences Household Survey, found that women were more likely to be retrenched than 
men, and that this was “suggestive of discriminatory retrenchment policies.”40 The study 
also found that the probability of women with young children being reemployed fell by 23% 
in households with no older people. J. Giles, A. Park, and F. Cai, using the 2001 China Urban 
Labour Survey, found a “strong positive relationship between education and the probability 
of reemployment and a negative relationship between age and reemployment, with these 
effects being particularly strong for women.”41 Thus, less-educated and older women 
were less likely to find jobs after being retrenched. The study also reported that women 
with college-age children were more likely than those with older children to find new 
employment. This is because women with older children were more likely to be involved in 
looking after grandchildren or parents. This partially explains how family circumstances (the 
necessity of paying for education and caring for the young and elderly) could have caused a 
rapid decrease in female labor force participation rates during this period.
Consistent with these findings of the gender impacts of state sector retrenchment, X. Dong 
and M. Pandey report that the sensitivity of female employment to output shocks was 
much higher in reformed than unreformed SOEs.42 While SOE restructuring led to large 
job losses for both men and women, the increasing role of the market in Chinese industry 
negatively influenced the gender composition of employment in SOEs, with women more 
likely to be laid off and less likely to be hired, reflecting inequality of opportunity.43 The loss 
of employment for women in the state-owned sector not only meant they were excluded 
from relatively better-waged employment, but also from employment that typically 
provided higher workplace benefits and childcare provision.
According to national data, from 1994 to 2003, women’s employment in SOEs fell from 
over 40 million to 25 million. This was the period of major job losses for women (and men) 
in this sector. As reforms progressed in the following decade, women’s total employment in 
40 S. Appleton et al. 2002. Labour Retrenchment in China: Determinants and Consequences. China Economic Review.  
13 (2). p. 272.
41 J. Giles, A. Park, and F. Cai. 2006. Reemployment of Dislocated Workers in Urban China: The Roles of Information and 
Incentives. Journal of Comparative Economics. 34. p.605.
42 X. Dong and M. Pandey. 2012. Gender and Labor Retrenchment in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises: Investigation 
Using Firm-Level Panel Data. China Economic Review. 23 (2). pp. 385–395.
43 X. Dong, S. Li, and S. Yang. 2016. Trade Liberalization, Social Policy Development and Labour Market Outcomes of 
Chinese Women and Men in the Decade After China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization. Discussion Paper 
No. 9. New York: UN Women (February, p. 4).
The loss of employment 
for women in the 
state-owned sector 
not only meant they 
were excluded from 
relatively better waged 
employment but also 
from employment that 
typically provided higher 
workplace benefits and 
childcare provision. 
Gender Equality and the Labor Market: Women, Work, and Migration in the People’s Republic of China18
the SOEs remained relatively stable (Figure 5). SOE employment practices have become 
much more heterogeneous, with some seeking to compete by reducing wages, and at least 
some others moving to employment relationships that are more similar to “Japanese-style 
capitalism,” and include employee welfare provisions.44 Regardless of the direction taken by 
SOE enterprises, this sector has become less important in urban areas as other ownership 
categories increased in absolute and relative importance for urban women employees. 
Figure 7 shows that, in 2003, the share of women’s employment in SOEs was twice that 
of the share employed in the “other” ownership units. By 2013, the share of women’s 
employment in the “other” sector was nearly 50% higher than the share of women’s 
employment in SOEs. Women’s employment in SOEs stagnated and employment in the 
“other” sector grew from 12 million to almost 37 million over the decade. Therefore, it is 
important to place stronger emphasis on policy reform and legal protection in the private 
sector, to reflect the increasing importance of this sector to women’s employment.
3.3.2 Increased Gender Wage Discrimination
The market transition involved a shift in the share of employment away from SOEs to 
private enterprises and, thus, a movement away from wages determined by administrative 
rules to wages determined in competitive markets. The implication of this for gender wage 
gaps is an empirical question. 
While separate data on wages for men and women is limited in national statistical series, 
evidence indicates that the gender wage gap is increasing, reflecting increased gender 
inequality in treatment in the workplace. The World Bank reports that the ratio of wages 
for women to men fell from 83% in 1990, to 70% in 1999.45 In 2010, the ratio of income 
of employed women to employed men in urban areas was 67.3%, and in rural areas 56.0% 
(Footnote 27, p. 57), suggesting a further decline in the gender wage ratio.46 While the exact 
women–men earnings ratio clearly depends on factors included in the analysis, such as 
type of income (e.g., wages, self-employment earnings, and value of pensions); age group; 
location; and employment status, among others, nonetheless, it appears that gender wage 
inequality increased.
Empirical studies reported not only a rising gender wage gap, but also, in many cases, rising 
gender wage discrimination.47 The bulk of evidence reviewed indicates that the market 
transition period is associated with increased gender wage discrimination,48 which is 
44 A. Chan and J. Unger. 2009. A Chinese State Enterprise under the Reforms: What Model of Capitalism? The China 
Journal. 62, pp. 1–26.
45 World Bank. 2002. China Country Gender Review. Washington, DC.: East Asia Environment & Social Development Unit 
(p. 14).
46 S. Appleton, L. Song, and Q. Xia. 2014. Understanding Urban Wage Inequality in China 1988–2008: Evidence from 
Quintile Analysis. World Development. 62 (1). pp. 1–13.
47 Gender wage discrimination refers to gender differences in the return to endowments, such as education and labor 
market experience, which determine productivity and wages. Empirical analyses of the gender wage gap typically 
distinguish between the explained portion of the gap and the unexplained portion of the gap which is attributed 
to discrimination or unobserved factors affecting productivity. The explained portion of the gap refers to gender 
differences in productivity-enhancing characteristics such as endowments of education or labor market experience at 
the individual level of job characteristics. The unexplained portion of the gap refers to the differences in the return to 
these productivity-enhancing characteristics.
48 Estimates of the degree of gender wage discrimination vary in the number of variables reflecting productivity-
enhancing characteristics included in the degree of disaggregation in these variables and, particularly, in the 
occupation variable, the sample size and representativeness in the sense of number of provinces included, and years 
covered. Most of the studies use data for workers with wage employment with urban hukou and, thus, exclude self-
employed workers and migrant workers in urban areas, and all workers in rural areas.
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estimated to have increased from about 50% in 1988 (B. Gustafsson and S. Li, using data 
from the Urban Household Income Survey, for 10 provinces),49 to 86% in 2001 (M. Wang 
and F. Cai, using data from China Urban Labor Survey for five large cities).50 B. Su and 
A. Heshmati provided a similar estimate of 86%, using data from the China Family Panel 
Studies.51 Most recently, the ILO reported estimated gender wage discrimination at greater 
than 90%, based upon the China Family Panel Studies, which covers both rural and urban 
PRC, and using a comprehensive set of variables, including age, age squared, education, 
location, occupation, tenure in job, location, and urban and rural provinces.52 
There is evidence the declining SOE employment associated with the market transition is 
linked with a rising gender wage gap. Several studies report lower gender wage gaps in the 
state-owned sector compared with the private sector. Using data for Shanghai and Jinan 
in 1995 and 1996, P. Liu, X. Meng, and J. Zhang found that the gender wage gap is higher 
in the private sector than in state sector53 (see also J. Hughes and M. Maurer-Fazio),54 and 
other studies found that gender wage discrimination is highest in the most market-oriented 
firms.55  
One of the most comprehensive studies, using data from 1989 to 2009, showed the gender 
wage gap increasing, with the decline in the state sector employment as one of the reasons. 
However, the impacts were not equal across different groups of women, as mothers were 
increasingly disadvantaged while single women maintained their position relative to men.56 
Other research, within the PRC and internationally, documented that mothers experience 
a large wage penalty; 37% in the case of the PRC.57 Further, the earnings gap between 
mothers and childless women with the same human capital characteristics was found to 
increase sharply over the first decade of the 2000s in the private sector.58 
49 B. Gustafsson and S. Li. 2000. Economic Transformation and the Gender Earnings Gap in Urban China. Journal of 
Population Economics.13. pp. 305–329.
50 M. Wang and F. Cai. 2008. Gender Earnings Differential in Urban China. Review of Development Economics. 12 (2).  
pp. 442–454.
51 B. Su and A. Heshmati. 2011. Analysis of Gender Wage Differential in China’s Urban Labor Market. IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 6252. Bonn (December).
52 ILO. 2015. Women in the Labour Market in China. ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series. Bangkok.
53 This study, by comparing wages in the state, collective, and private sectors, finds that the gender wage gap is highest 
in the private sector, as is the absolute level of gender wage discrimination. However, in the private sector, the share 
of the gender wage gap explained by discrimination is the lowest. That is, the increase in the gender wage gap due to 
marketization is much greater than the increase due to discrimination. P Liu, X. Meng, and J. Zhang. 2000. Sectoral 
Gender Wage Differentials and Discrimination in the Transitional Chinese Economy. Journal of Population Economics. 
13. pp. 331–352.
54 J. Hughes and M. Maurer-Fazio. 2002. Effects of Marriage, Education, and Occupation on the Female/Male Wage 
Gap in China. Pacific Economic Review. 7 (1). pp. 137–156.
55 L. Li and X. Dong. 2011. Economic Transition and the Gender Earnings Gap in Chinese Industry: The Role of Firm 
Characteristics. Contemporary Economic Policy. 29 (1). pp. 67–87.
56 This study was based on annual wage earnings from 1989 to 2009 as collected by the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey, which is based on data from eight provinces. Y. Zhang and E. Hannum. 2015. Diverging Fortunes:  
The Evolution of Gender Wage Gaps for Singles, Couples and Parents in China, 1989–2009. Chinese Journal of 
Sociology. 1 (1). pp. 15–55.
57 D. Grimshaw and J. Rubery. 2015. The Motherhood Pay Gap: A Review of the Issues, Theory, and International 
Evidence. Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 57. Geneva: International Labour Office (p. 13).
58 This finding is based on N. Jia and X. Dong. The Effect of Paid Maternity Leave on Breastfeeding Duration: Evidence 
from Urban China. Unpublished manuscript, which used urban responses from the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey, 1991–2006. Both annual wages (including bonuses) and hourly wages were used (footnote 43, p.5). The 
results showed that the motherhood pay gap (caused in part by mothers working part-time and taking low-paid jobs) 
increased substantially in what the authors call the rapid liberalization period (post-1999), but not in the previous 
period, and in the nonstate sector, but not in the state sector. The orders of magnitude of the motherhood penalty are 
comparable with those reported by D. Grimshaw and J. Rubery (footnote 57). 
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While the PRC’s labor market has become more competitive, studies show that significant 
elements of segmentation remain, meaning that pay and conditions can differ for workers 
with the same human capital characteristics, depending on the sector in which they work.59 
With respect to segmentation based upon ownership sector, a study using data points 
from the mid-1980s, 1990s, and 2000–2009 found that gender earnings differentials 
increased over time and across the earnings distribution. It also found evidence of a “ ‘sticky 
floor’ effect”60 which affected women production workers in the non-SOE sectors who 
had relatively low pay and education levels; these women, the study concluded, “may 
face aggravated pay discrimination.” 61 The results, concluding that women were relatively 
better-off (meaning the gender earnings gap was lower) working in the state sector than 
in the private, foreign, and joint venture sectors, were consistent with other studies using a 
cross-section approach (footnote 61, p. 256). 
Other studies also found an increasing gender wage gap in urban areas, attributed to the 
difficulty women found securing employment while having to take on increasing care 
responsibilities as state provisions declined. As a result, there was a greater likelihood of 
women than men experiencing downward occupational and industrial mobility following 
state sector restructuring, and more women than men being pushed into the low-paid 
informal sector.62 Therefore, this is one explanation of the increasing gender earnings gap 
(footnote 43, p. 5).  
While there is evidence of rising gender wage discrimination during the market transition, 
its existence and degree may vary among types of firms in the private sector.63 Firms that 
were more globally integrated tended to pay their female employees their marginal product 
or higher, whereas domestically oriented firms were found to engage in gender wage 
discrimination.64 
There is evidence that women’s employment in the lower occupation levels (within any 
broad occupational group) is a key determinant of the increase in the overall gender 
wage gap in wage discrimination. L. Xiu and M. Gunderson demonstrate the importance 
of examining this intra-occupational segregation, using data from the 2005 Census. For 
specific broad groups, such as the professional and manufacturing occupations, accounting 
for the intra-occupation distribution is important.65 L. Xiu and M. Gunderson found that 
women are concentrated in the lower-paying areas (within occupations), indicating gender 
59 J. Knight and L. Yeuh. 2009. Segmentation or competition in China’s urban labour market? Cambridge Journal of 
Economics. 33 (1). pp. 79–94; and S. Démurger, S. Li, and J. Yang. 2012. Earnings differentials between the public and 
private sectors in China: Exploring changes for urban local residents in the 2000s. China Economic Review. 23 (1).  
pp. 138–153.
60 Where the gender wage gap is greater at lower levels of wages.
61 W. Chi and B. Li. 2008. Glass Ceiling or Sticky Floor? Examining the Gender Earnings Differential across the Earnings 
Distribution in Urban China. Journal of Comparative Economics. 36. p. 261.
62 S. Cook and X. Dong. 2011. Harsh Choices: Chinese Women’s Paid Work and Unpaid Care Responsibilities under 
Economic Reform. Development and Change. 42 (4). p. 951.
63 Evidence of gender wage discrimination is also counter to the theoretical argument that gender discrimination should 
be reduced (or eliminated) in more competitive market-oriented sectors.
64 A. Dammert, B. Marchand, and C. Wan. 2013. Gender Wage-Productivity Differentials and Global Integration in China. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 7159. January. p. 4; and J. Rickne. 2012. Gender and Work Compensation in China’s Industrial 
Sector. Review of Income and Wealth. 58 (2). pp. 307–329.
65 L. Xiu and M. Gunderson. 2015. Occupational Segregation and the Gender Earnings Gap in China: Devil’s in the 
Details. International Journal of Manpower. 36 (5). pp. 711–732.
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inequality in opportunity, which gives rise to the gender wage gap and contributes to the 
gender wage discrimination estimate. W. Chi and B. Li identified the sticky floor effect using 
data from the Urban Household Surveys of 1987, 1996, and 2004. They concluded that 
low-waged women workers, with low levels of education, working in the nonstate sector 
experience higher wage discrimination (footnote 61).  
The complexity of the changes in, and drivers of, the gender gaps is also evident in the 
analysis of gender earnings (as opposed to wages) undertaken by X. Dong, S. Li, and S. Yang 
(footnote 43, p. 29). They found that the gender earnings gap increased for urban hukou 
and rural workers, but decreased for migrant workers. For other individual characteristics, 
they also reported that the gender earnings gap increased for all age groups, except for the 
oldest and youngest, all educational categories, and all groups differentiated by marital 
status and the presence of young children.66
The rise in reported gender wage gaps and gender wage discrimination over the past 
30 years, corresponding with market transition and increased privatization, provides 
evidence for the hypothesis that increased market influences and competitiveness 
have not overcome the patriarchal norms negatively affecting women’s treatment in the 
labor market.  
The implication of these studies is that, given the high degree of wage discrimination, 
increasing women’s endowments alone will not reduce the gender wage gap, and ways 
must be found to increase the return to women’s endowments. Improving women’s 
position in the industrial hierarchy is important. Further, as L. Xiu and M. Gunderson 
note, it is important to remove the barriers women face in advancing their careers within 
occupations, and to improve their ability to balance home and work responsibilities 
(footnote 65). 
Women employed in the private sector face a range of working conditions, depending 
on the industrial sector in which they work, their education level, and their household 
registration status. Migrant women working in manufacturing are discussed in the next 
section, as well as women working in the urban service sector. Here, the focus is on the rise 
of the private sector and the position of women in the professions, as entrepreneurs, and in 
self-employment.   
It should also be noted that, to the extent that a choice is possible, the changing dynamics 
of the labor market and the shift to private sector employment, in particular, are sometimes 
negotiated at the household level. That is, while we focus on gender differences, it is also 
the case that household strategies are followed. In urban areas of the PRC, this might take 
the form of one spouse working in the state sector to obtain the security and benefits that 
come with that employment, while the other seeks private sector employment to obtain 
higher income than might be available in the state sector; this was more likely the case 
some decades ago before the large decrease in state-sector employment. Household 
strategizing is, of course, also applicable more generally to rural households and to 
66 Also reported is that the gender earnings gap was larger for married workers than for unmarried workers, and for 
workers with young children than those without. 
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migration decisions where households diversify income sources to reduce risk,67 although 
this typically has more to do with different forms of private nonfarm employment than 
different ownership forms. This highlights the complex dynamics of employment shifts, and 
the need to be aware of household strategies and intra-household decision-making and 
distributional considerations (see F. Carlsson et al. on intra-household decision-making).68 
Here, we focus on the gendered outcomes rather than the household decision-making 
processes.
3.3.3  Rise in Women’s Employment in the Private Sector:  
Professionals, Entrepreneurs; and Self-Employment and Informality
The World Bank Enterprise Survey documented that 17.5% of firms in the PRC had a female 
as top manager, compared with 19.7% in upper middle-income countries, and 29.3% in East 
Asia and the Pacific. The percentage of firms with a female top manager in the PRC was 
higher for enterprises with 19 or fewer employees (21.8% female top managers) than for 
large enterprises with over 100 employees (12.8% female top managers).69 
Other estimates place the PRC lower down the ranking, with reportedly the lowest 
percentage of female managers and professionals (16%) in a study of 20 countries.70 This 
again points to the need for standardized and systematic data collection disaggregated by 
gender, and suggests that women still experience barriers to promotion, climbing internal 
job ladders, and assuming managerial and professional roles within firms. In the case of one 
expanding profession, the legal profession, women’s employment opportunities increased, 
but they earn less and are less likely to be partners than their male counterparts.71 
International evidence finds that gender diversity at senior management and board levels 
improves firm performance.72 According to Global Women Entrepreneur Leaders data, only 
5.6% of chief executive officers and 8.0% of board members in the PRC are women.73 The 
ILO refers to a report showing that the PRC ranked 88th out of 126 countries in progress 
on women in top management positions, with only 16.8% of such positions filled by women 
(footnote 24, p. 3) again indicating occupational segregation.
While women are less prominent in the professions, in senior management, and on 
company boards, what of women entrepreneurs? ADB notes that “the PRC has spawned 
67 J. E. Taylor, S. Rozelle, and A. de Brauw. 2003. Migration and Incomes in Source Communities: A New Economics of 
Migration Perspective from China. Economic Development and Cultural Change. 52 (1). pp. 75–101.
68 F. Carlsson et al. 2012. Household Decision-Making in Rural China: Using Experiments to Estimate the Influence of 
Spouses. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization. 84 (2). pp. 525–536.
69 The Enterprise Survey also shows that the PRC has a substantially higher proportion of firms with female participation 
in ownership (64.2%) than upper middle-income countries (38.4%), and a slightly higher proportion than in East Asia 
and the Pacific (58.7%). World Bank. 2012. China: Country Profile 2012. Enterprise Surveys. Washington, DC (p. 13).
70 M. Davidson and R. Burke. 2011. Women in Management Worldwide: Progress and Prospects. Second edition. Farnham, 
UK: Gower. (p. 7). Also of note is the finding by X. Dong, S. Li and S. Yang (footnote 43, p. 20) that the unemployment 
rate of those with college and university education increased during the first decade of the 2000s and that the 
“gender unemployment gap for the most educated became more pronounced.” One area of future research would 
be to examine the causes of the relatively low reported percentage of female managers and professionals and the 
increase in the gender unemployment gap of the most educated workers, which indicate that women experience 
greater difficulty than men in obtaining employment.
71 E. Michelson. 2009. Gender Inequality in the Chinese Legal Profession. In Lisa Keister, ed. Work and Organizations in 
China after Thirty Years of Transition (Research in the Sociology of Work, Volume 19). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
pp. 337–376.
72 V. Hunt, D. Layton, and S. Prince. 2014. Diversity Matters. McKinsey & Company.
73 DELL. 2015. 2015 Global Women Entrepreneur Leaders Scorecard. http://powermore.dell.com/gwelscorecard/
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half of the world’s self-made women billionaires” (footnote 23, p. 23). However, the PRC 
ranked 15th out of 31 countries in the 2015 Global Women Entrepreneur Leaders Scorecard 
(footnote 73). 
Women entrepreneurs are found in nontraditional sectors. In a study of entrepreneurs 
in the electronics industry, J. Tan found women entrepreneurs to be more willing to 
take higher risks in return for the prospect of higher rewards, and to outperform their 
male counterparts.74 These results are important for illustrating the heterogeneity of 
the entrepreneur category, and for suggesting that caution is necessary in ascribing 
stereotypical features to women entrepreneurs, such as working exclusively in low-end 
services and responding to necessity rather than opportunity. While this evidence may 
show that well-educated, well-connected women in the PRC may become successful 
entrepreneurs, are there general conclusions that can be reached with respect to the PRC’s 
entrepreneurs?
3.3.3.1 Women are Less Likely to be Entrepreneurs
The first general conclusion that can be made is that women are less likely to become 
entrepreneurs than men, as shown in official documents stating that women account 
for only one-quarter of all the PRC’s entrepreneurs (although the trend is upward) 
(footnote 10). Using data from surveys of a “randomly selected, almost nationally 
representative sample of 60 villages in six provinces of rural China” for the period 
1981–2000, women were found to be significantly less likely to be engaged in high 
productivity self-employment than men.75 A representative national urban household 
survey administered in 2000 concluded that women were less likely to be entrepreneurs.76 
Thus, the market transition expelled women from the state-owned sector, but they are 
underrepresented as entrepreneurs in the emerging private sector.
Government policy encouraged migrants to return to their rural homes to set up 
enterprises, using the knowledge and skills gained during their urban migration.77 Studies 
found that migrants returning to rural areas sometimes have the option (or face the 
necessity) of becoming entrepreneurs, but for this group, too, it was found that married 
men are more likely to become entrepreneurs than married women, and that men often 
drew on intrafamily work-sharing resources (in other words, their wives worked for them 
74 J. Tan. 2008. Breaking the “Bamboo Curtain” and the “Glass Ceiling”: The Experience of Women Entrepreneurs in 
High-Tech Industries in an Emerging Market. Journal of Business Ethics. 80 (3). pp. 547–564.
75 Who qualifies as an “entrepreneur” is not a straightforward question and researchers differ on the use of terminology. 
In the study by S. Mohapatra, S. Rozelle, and R. Goodhue, the self-employed are divided into those engaged in high 
productivity activities (as indicated by relatively high levels of education and capital intensity of production) and low 
productivity activities, with the former associated with entrepreneurship. The educational differences between men 
and women who are self-employed are used as a point of departure in the later discussion of self-employment. It 
should be noted that, even here, the use of the term “self-employment” is open to interpretation; technically, farmers 
are “self-employed,” but they are typically excluded from studies and measurement. Others distinguish between those 
in the self-employed sector on whether they employ others; this is the case for the later discussion of the informal 
sector. Since much activity in the informal sector is in firms not registered as business units, this is another reason 
why self-employment in this sector is not included in entrepreneur counts. S. Mohapatra, S. Rozelle, and R. Goodhue. 
2007. The Rise of Self-Employment in Rural China: Development or Distress? World Development. 35 (1). p. 171.
76 L. Yeuh. 2009. China’s Entrepreneurs. World Development. 37 (4). pp. 778–786.
77 For example, in mid-2015, the central government announced “Back to the Countryside” policies aimed at facilitating 
return migration and starting new businesses (State Council. 2015. State Council’s Suggestions on Supporting Migrant 
Workers Returning Home as Entrepreneurs. (In Chinese). Document No. 47. Beijing (21 June). These policies are in 
their infancy and a gender assessment of their operations and outcomes would be an important future exercise.
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in the family business).78 This is consistent with national labor force data, which shows 
that 4.5% of women work as unpaid family workers, compared with only 1.1% of men 
(footnote 15, Table 1–39.).
For women who become entrepreneurs, social networks are likely to be important. While 
women are less likely to be entrepreneurs than men, networks are important for both and, 
for women, the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur is increased if the woman has 
a mother who is/was a skilled professional and has a larger social network (footnote 78, 
p. 782). J. Scott et al. also stress the importance of guanxi networks79 for women in 
becoming successful entrepreneurs.
Women entrepreneurs are also reportedly discriminated against in credit markets.  
A recent study in Chengdu found that the prevalence of gender stereotyping meant that 
many women entrepreneurs felt discouraged from even applying for bank loans. Further, 
the bank had no monitoring system to assess whether there was gender bias in its loan 
portfolio.80 Thus, women’s participation in the economy as entrepreneurs faces many social 
and economic barriers, resulting in their being underrepresented among entrepreneurs, 
and more likely to be found in lower-end activities. While some policy initiatives were 
introduced to address this, such as the incubators to assist women entrepreneurs set up in 
Tianjin in 2000 and Qingdao in 2012, it is argued that these are more geared toward well-
educated, urban women, and a large proportion of women entrepreneurs who need support 
are not receiving it.81   
The need to provide gender-targeted entrepreneurship programs is confirmed by 
international evidence, which acknowledges that women face time and decision-making 
autonomy barriers that limit their potential as entrepreneurs.82
The economic significance of facilitating more women entrepreneurs is clear. The Global 
Women Entrepreneur Leaders data suggests that, if female and male entrepreneurs 
increased at the same rate, this would lead to an additional 7.4 million business start-ups 
and 74.4 million additional jobs over 2 years (footnote 73). A similar conclusion is reached 
by the ILO, which reports that “the relatively low entrepreneurial activity rate of women 
may mean that there are barriers to setting up businesses for women which leads to a loss 
of potential contribution of women to the Chinese economy (footnote 24, p. 9).”
78 S. Démurger and H Xu. 2011. Return Migrants: The Rise of New Entrepreneurs in Rural China. World Development.  
39 (10). pp. 1,847–1,861. For a discussion of the credit constraints faced by migrant entrepreneurs, see P. Frijters, K. Tao, 
and X. Meng. 2011. Migrant Entrepreneurs and Credit Constraints under Labor Market Discrimination. IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 5967. September.
79 Scott et al. 2014. The Role of Guanxi Networks in the Performance of Women-Led Firms in China. International 
Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship. 6 (1). pp. 68–82. Guanxi here refers to the web of personal relationships that 
facilitate business activity in the PRC.
80 L. Scott and J. Lin. 2014. Finance After Hours: A Case Study of Women’s Access to Credit. Oxford: University of Oxford: 
Said Business School.
81 T. Warneke. 2013. Can Female Entrepreneurship Programmes Support Social and Solidarity Economy? Insights from China 
and India. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
82 ILO. 2014. Effectiveness of Entrepreneurship Development Interventions for Women Entrepreneurs: An ILO-WED Issue 
Brief. Geneva (p. 9).
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3.3.3.2 Gender Differences in Self-Employment and Informality
The realm of self-employment is heterogeneous, especially when including both urban and 
rural sectors, and is not well-studied. One of the few studies to examine self-employment 
systematically (although relying on 1996 data) found that women’s self-employment 
earnings in urban areas of the PRC were, on average, just 42% of men’s earnings.83 Much of 
this can be attributed to industrial or occupational segregation, with women found more 
often in lower-paying unskilled areas, such as domestic service and street vending, than men, 
who were more likely to be involved in skilled areas and small businesses (which also had 
some employees). This is consistent with the earlier discussion on entrepreneurs in which 
continued patriarchal norms reserve the position of head of the family business to men, 
and rely on the unpaid labor of women family members including the spouse; those self-
employed in small businesses that also had some employees were more likely to be men. 
Segregation of the self-employed in industry is consistent with the distribution of 
educational attainment and self-employment, where less-educated women are more likely 
to be self-employed than men with the same level of education, whereas among those 
with higher levels of education, men are more likely to be self-employed than women 
(footnote 43, Table 1–51). One hypothesis is that less-educated women find it harder to 
find employment and are, therefore, more likely to be self-employed out of necessity, but 
this area requires further research.
The market transition, ongoing for over 3 decades but more intense since the SOE 
restructuring in the mid-1990s, can also be seen by the increase in the informal sector 
dating from that time. Measurement is problematic in this area but some studies work with 
existing data to estimate the size of, and trends in, informality.84 According to D. Yang and 
W. Meiyang, informal employment increased substantially after 1997 and now accounts 
for approximately one-third of urban employment. Their approach calculates informal 
employment as a residual using national statistical sources. They calculate the size of the 
informal sector as the difference between “total employment based on the labour market 
survey” and the employment data from the “Labour Comprehensive Reporting System,” 
which includes all registered enterprises.85 This assumes that the informal sector consists of 
workers outside registered enterprises. On this basis, they show a large increase in the size 
of the informal employment from the mid-1990s until around 2002, and a stable number of 
informal employees thereafter. 
In relation to the gender composition of the informal sector, D. Yang and W. Meiyang used data 
from the 2005 China Urban Labour Survey to report that female workers are disproportionately 
represented, with 35.1% of women 40 years of age and below employed in the informal sector 
(compared with 30.3% of men), 36% of women ages 41–50 years of age (compared with 32.6% 
of men), 36% of women 51–60 years of age (compared with 24% of men), and 45.5% of women 
83 Q. Zhang. 2013. Gender Disparities in Self-Employment in Urban China’s Market Transition: Income Inequality, 
Occupational Segregation, and Mobility Processes. China Quarterly. 215. p. 751.
84 There is no official data on the size of the informal sector. The forthcoming ILO report, China Labour Market Profile, 
will include a section on estimating “nonstandard” employment and “informal work”. Two studies are reviewed here 
that advance definitions and analysis based upon them.
85 D. Yang and W. Meiyan. 2010. Demographic Aging and Employment in China. ILO: Employment Sector, Employment 
Working Paper No. 57. p. 8.
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over 61 years of age (compared with 41.2% of men) (footnote 85, p. 25). Thus, elderly women 
are more likely than younger women to be employed in the informal sector, and women of all 
age groups are more likely than men to be in the informal sector.
In another recent study, X. Dong, S. Li, and S. Wang (footnote 43, pp. 24–25) calculate 
informal employment in total nonagricultural employment as informal self-employment 
(i.e., own-account workers and unpaid contributing family workers) plus informal wage 
employment (i.e., wage workers without labor contracts and casual workers). They, 
therefore, use a job-based, rather than an enterprise-based, definition. Using survey data 
from 2002 and 2010, they report that informal (nonagricultural) employment declined as a 
percentage of the labor force from 2002 to 2010, although it still represented over 40% of 
employment for both men and women in the later year.86 Informal wage employment was 
by a substantial margin the most important type of informal employment for both women 
and men. In terms of gender gaps, female urban hukou holders recorded a 4.2 percentage 
points higher level of informality than their male counterparts, and female migrant workers 
a 10.3 percentage points higher level of informality than male migrant workers.87 There were 
large differences between women, with 64.1% of female migrant workers, 54.2% of rural 
women workers, and 22.8% of female urban hukou holders classified as being in informal 
employment.  
When including the agriculture sector, X. Dong, S. Li, and S. Yang calculate a different 
but related concept, “vulnerable employment,” as the sum of own-account workers in 
agricultural and nonagricultural activities and unpaid contributing household workers 
(footnote 43, pp. 22–24.). They report that women are disproportionately represented in 
less-secure employment, with a gender gap in vulnerable employment of 11.9 percentage 
points in 2002, and 11.6 percentage points in 2010. 
Informal employment is clearly a large sector in which women are disproportionately 
represented. The importance of understanding its dynamics and possible policy responses 
to improve the working lives of women is also clear. More research would be beneficial in 
this area. 
The impacts of the market transition on gender equality in the labor market are 
summarized in Figure 8. 
86 The data used in this report comes from the 2002 and 2010 Household Income Project (CHIP) cycles. This data set is 
described further in footnote 103.
87 Migration is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.3.
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Source: Author.
Figure 8: Gender, Work, and the Market Transition
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4 The Structural Transition 
4.1  General Features
Structural change in the PRC, as elsewhere, involves the shift of production away from the primary sector, dominated by agriculture, to the secondary sector, dominated 
by manufacturing (see H. Chenery and M. Syrquin for analysis of structural change and 
development).88 The structural transition in the PRC started in the 1950s, and intensified 
in the 1990s with migration. The structural transition is associated with the export-led 
development strategy that increased demand for labor in the manufacturing sector 
of coastal provinces. Structural change is less evident from changes in shares of gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Figure 9) than shares of employment (Figure 10), but it is 
significant by any measure. This sector shift explains a good part of the rapidly increasing 
per capita incomes over the past 3 decades identified in Section 1.
88 H. Chenery and M. Syrquin. 1975. Patterns of Development: 1950–1970. New York: Oxford University Press for the  
World Bank.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 2015. China Statistical Yearbook 2015. Beijing: China Statistics Press  
(Table 3-2).
Figure 9: Distribution of Gross Domestic Product by Sector (%), 2000–2014
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The shift toward the tertiary sector is also evident in Figures 9–10, showing the share of 
GDP and employment increasing steadily over time. This shift is more evident in some parts 
of the country than in others (particularly in the eastern coastal provinces), but is certainly 
observed at the national level and is targeted to continue under the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan (2016–2020). The structural transition, involving the transfer of labor from lower- to 
higher-productivity sectors can, therefore, be seen in the changing structure of the PRC’s 
economy from agriculture to industry and, especially in the higher-income regions, in a 
post-industrial shift toward services. 
There were significant shifts in the sector composition of employment, especially in the 
decline in the percentage of the labor force employed in the primary sector. However, that 
the primary sector still accounts for 31% of employment, but contributes only 9% of GDP, 
indicates that labor productivity is still much lower in this sector, and that further labor 
transfers and sector shifts can be expected.
4.2 Women’s Employment and the 
Structural Transition
While the structural transition affected both men and women, a disproportionate number 
of women still work in the agriculture sector. While the proportion of men and women in 
this category has been falling, it still accounted for 31% of men’s employment and 43% of 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1-5).
Figure 10: Distribution of Employment (%) by Sector, 2000–2014
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women’s employment in 2013, down from 54% for men and 63% for women in 2003.89 
Therefore, a substantial shift of employment out of agriculture is continuing, but the pace 
of transfer is faster for men, and women are disproportionately engaged in the lowest 
average productivity sector. X. Dong, S. Li, and S. Yang also note that segregation takes the 
form of women being concentrated in agriculture and low-end services and men being 
employed in industry and high-end services. They report that women’s employment in 
agriculture is 11.3 percentage points higher than men’s, and 5.7 percentage points higher 
than men in low-end services (footnote 43, pp. 22–23). In contrast, women’s employment 
is 10.2 percentage points lower than men’s in industry, and 6.8 percentage points lower 
in high-end services. These findings are consistent with the ILO’s conclusion that “there 
is clearly a concentration of women workers at the lower end of the skill and productivity 
spectrum, relative to men” (footnote 52, p. 3).
This pattern is evident in industry where it can be documented in more detail, given the 
available data. Industrial segregation by sex is a standard indicator of “the extent to which 
women and men benefit from different opportunities and treatment in work life”.90 The 
extent of industrial segregation by sex is discussed first here. The discussion then analyzes 
whether women are disproportionately employed in lower-paid industries, thereby 
indicating that industrial segregation works to women’s disadvantage. 
Within the urban economy, manufacturing dominates female employment in urban 
units, employing over 20 million of the 63 million women employed in urban units, in 
2013 (Table 2). Another significant employer of women in urban units in the secondary 
sector is construction (2.95 million). In the tertiary service sector, the largest employers of 
women are the wholesale and retail trades, with 4.36 million women employed, financial 
intermediation with 2.72 million, education with 8.76 million, health and social services with 
4.73 million, and public management with 4.65 million. 
While this data points to the importance of urban sectors by the absolute number of women 
employed in them, women are not equally found in all sectors. In fact, women clearly 
dominate some industries in the urban economy, as illustrated in Figure 11, which shows that 
women make up 35% of the total workforce in urban units, but there is considerable variation 
in their share of employment by sector. This is also the case within sectors.
For example, within the manufacturing sector (the largest employer in terms of total 
number of women employees in urban units), there is also a gendered division of labor.91 
While women comprise 39.4% of the urban manufacturing labor force, they constitute over 
50% of the labor force in the following manufacturing industries: 
• textiles (59.1%); 
• textiles and apparel (66.5%); 
• leather, fur, feather, and footwear (59.3%); and
• arts and crafts, sports and entertainment equipment (57.3%). 
89 The figures are for those whose occupations are classified as “agriculture and water conservancy laborers.” This 
classification does not correspond exactly to the definition of “primary industry” discussed above. Also, footnote 15, 
Table 1–51 and footnote 16, Table 1–38).
90 ILO. 2012. Decent Work Indicators: Concepts and Definitions. Geneva (p. 127).
91 Data in this, and the next five paragraphs, is calculated from NBS and MHRSS (footnote 15, Table 3-1), except where 
otherwise indicated. 
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 Table 2: Women’s Employment and Share of Employment,  
Average Wages by Industry, Urban Units, 2013
Sector
Women 
Employed 
(million)
Share of Women 
Employees in 
Total Employees 
(%)
Average 
Annual 
Wage  
(yuan)
Subsector Average 
Wage/National 
Average Wage  
(%)
Manufacturing 20.738 39.4 46,431 90.2
Textiles 1.304 59.1 36,811 71.5
Textiles, wearing apparel, and accessories 1.750 66.5 37,581 73.0
Leather, fur, feather, and footwear 1.088 59.3 34,519 67.1
Electrical machinery and apparatus 1.625 40.7 47,436 92.1
Computers and communication equipment 3.604 48.5 50,143 97.4
Production and supply of electricity, heat, gas, 
and water
1.098 27.1 67,085 130.3
Construction 2.954 10.1 42,072 81.7
Wholesale and retail trade 4.463 50.1 50,308 97.7
Wholesale trade 1.684 42.0 65,615 127.4
Retail trade 2.778 56.7 37,674 73.2
Transport, storage, and post 2.19 25.9 57,993 112.6
Hotels and catering services 1.688 55.5 34,044 66.1
Information transmission, software, and 
information technology
1.289 39.4 90,915 176.6
Financial intermediaries 2.723 50.6 99,653 193.6
Real estate 1.341 35.9 51,048 99.2
Leasing and business services 1.385 32.8 62,538 121.5
Scientific research and technical services 1.171 30.2 76,602 148.8
Management of water conservancy 1.046 40.4 36,123 70.2
Education 8.766 52.0 51,950 100.9
Primary education 3.278 56.0 47,066 91.4
Secondary education 3.632 48.6 51,084 99.2
Health and social services 4.738 61.5 57,979 112.7
Public management, social security, and social 
organization
4.655 29.7 49,259 95.7
National 63.383 35.0 51,483
Note: The sectors chosen were selected from those employing more than 1 million women workers.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour Statistical 
Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 3-1).  
The share of women’s employment in the manufacturing sector fell over the decade 
from 43.4% in 2003 to 39.4% in 2013.92 Thus, women have been losing their share of 
manufacturing jobs to men; whether this is a result of technological upgrading in the 
manufacturing sector (see discussion below) or other factors remains to be determined. 
92 The percentage for 2003 is from NBS and MHRSS (footnote 14, Table 1–13).
Gender Equality and the Labor Market: Women, Work, and Migration in the People’s Republic of China32
In 2003, the percentage of women workers in the four manufacturing industries was 65.1% 
for textiles; 72.0% for textiles and apparel; 68.9% for leather, fur, feather, and footwear; and 
62.9% for arts and crafts, sports and entertainment equipment. Therefore, the data shows 
that, while segregation by gender in industry persists over time, it diminished somewhat in 
the past decade.93 This trend is replicated in occupational segregation. Here, the ILO finds 
that employed men are three times more likely to be “unit heads” than employed women, 
but there is some evidence of the gender gap closing over time (footnote 24, p. 11). 
Returning to the data for 2013, men hold a majority of the positions in all of the other 
27 manufacturing categories (although in some of these categories, women hold a higher 
percentage of positions than their share in the manufacturing workforce, even though they 
remain the minority). For example, women constitute 48.5% of those employed in the 
manufacture of computers, communication and electronics equipment, which is higher 
than their share in manufacturing employment (39.4%), and their share in total urban 
employment (35.0%). 
93 Data for 2003 is from NBS and MHRSS 2004.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Statistical Chart 5).
Figure 11: Women’s Share of Employment by Industry (%), Urban Units, 2013
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The manufacturing subsectors in which women dominate are also among the lowest paid. 
The average wage in the manufacturing sector as a whole is 90.2% of the national wage. 
Within the sector, the average wage in textiles is 79.3% of the sector wage: 80.9% in textiles, 
wearing apparel, and accessories; and 74.3% in leather, fur, feather, and footwear (Table 2). 
Each of these subsectors employs over 1 million women, who constitute the majority of 
the workforce, and their pay is among the lowest in the sector, which itself pays below 
the national average (Table 2). The argument that sectors with a high female share of 
employment are associated with low wages is illustrated by the scatter plot presented in the 
Appendix, and the Pearson correlation coefficient of minus 0.27.
Gendered division of work is again observed within the urban service sector, with women 
holding the majority of positions in
• the retail trade (56.7%),
• hotels and catering (55.5%),
• insurance (54.9%),
• primary education (56.0%), and 
• health and social services (61.5%) (Table 2).
Men hold the majority of positions in the other 40 service sector subcategories. The 
gendered division in both the manufacturing and service sectors is generally more 
pronounced in the private sector than the state-owned sector.94 The service sector is 
discussed further in Section 5.
Taking the employment shifts as a whole, an ILO report concludes that “while the move out 
of agricultural work may have resulted in some improvements in the earnings of women and 
men, women tend to dominate in the lowest-paying occupations” (footnote 24, p. 16).
Unemployment in the urban sector is also gendered, with women recording a larger rise in 
unemployment than men from 1988 to 2009 (to around 10% for prime-aged women).95 
Women are also likely to remain unemployed for a longer duration than men (Figure 12). 
Research suggests that this is not due to less motivation or job search activity by women, 
but to weaker social networks, less entitlement to reemployment services and gender-
differentiated mandatory retirement policies.96
94 See NBS and MHRSS (footnote 15, Table 1–17). The private sector in this context means the “other ownership units.”
95 X. Meng. 2012. Labor Market Outcomes and Reform in China. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 26 (4). p. 80. Official 
unemployment data in the PRC is not consistent with international definitions and typically lead to lower estimates 
of unemployment. For example, in 2002, the official unemployment rate stood at 4%. Using a five-city sample and 
applying international definitions, J. Giles, A. Park, and J. Zhang. 2005. What is China’s True Unemployment Rate? 
China Economic Review. 16. pp. 149–170, estimated unemployment to be 14%. The unemployment rate among women 
was 16.7 % and 12.0 % for men.
96 F. Du and X. Dong. 2009. Why Do Women Have Longer Durations of Unemployment than Men in Post-
Restructuring Urban China? Cambridge Journal of Economics. 33 (2). pp. 233–252. The PRC, unusually in Asia, has a 
gender difference in retirement policies, with retirement for women at age 50 (55 for the public service) and 60 for 
men (footnote 9, p. 28). The impacts on women of reforming the gendered retirement policy are controversial; for 
some women, the gendered policy is seen as an impediment to equal career advancement and to equal retirement 
income, while others fear that raising the retirement age for women may simply lead to greater unemployment for 
women in their 50s.  
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The high levels of female employment in the manufacturing (and other) sectors, are 
facilitated by intra- and inter-provincial migration. Patterns of migration are examined in 
the following section, and Section 4.4 provides a “decent work” analysis for female migrants 
in manufacturing. Women’s employment in the service sector is discussed in Section 5.
4.3  Gender, Migration, and the Structural 
Transition 
The shift from agriculture to industry was facilitated by the transfer of labor from rural 
to urban areas by temporary migration.97 There were 274 million migrants in 2014 and a 
further increase to 277 million in 2015.98 Internal migration increased dramatically as a 
result of structural change (and reforms) with the number of migrants in 1982 reported to 
be only 6.6 million.99 From 2000 to 2010, the number of migrants increased by 100 million, 
from 121 million to 221 million (footnote 13, Table 2–3). The scale of migration in relative 
97 Data on migrant workers has not been systematically collected in the same way as other population data because 
of the difficulty in collecting data for a mobile group without fixed residency (and often living in factory-provided 
dormitories). Further, there are multiple types of migration (rural–rural, rural–urban, and urban–rural), and migration 
of different duration, including circular migration. As a result, estimates of the size of the migrant workforce vary 
depending on the definition used and data collection methods. 
98 NBS. 2016. National Monitoring Report of Migrant Workers (in Chinese).
99 M. Lu and Y. Xia. 2016. Migration in the People’s Republic of China. ADBI Working Paper Series. No. 593. Manila.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1–77).
Figure 12: Unemployment Duration (months), Urban, Women, and Men, 2013
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terms is also enormous: migrants represent 36.6% of the urban population and 34.4% of the 
economically active population.100 
The transfer of labor from rural to urban areas, through temporary rural–urban migration, 
is a striking labor market change that is expected to continue, with rapid urbanization 
predicted by the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020). As X. Meng argued, “China’s 
single most important labor market change over the past two decades is probably the rapid 
growth in rural-to-urban migration” (footnote 95, p. 87). 
Given the relatively low agricultural productivity and low wages in the off-farm, rural sector, 
the higher wages in urban areas are a key pull factor for migrant labor. Average urban 
income is more than three times higher than average rural income, and the ratio increased 
over the first decade of the 2000s. The average urban-to-rural income ratio increased 
from 3.2 to 3.8 from 2002 to 2008, based upon national China Household Income Project 
(CHIP) data.101 As further evidence of the rural–urban income gap, J. Knight, Q. Deng, and 
S. Li report that the wages of rural migrants in urban areas are 2.4 times higher, on average, 
than the migrants’ estimate of their monthly income had they stayed in their home village 
(in 2007 based on the CHIP data).102 Rural–urban migration was also facilitated by further 
relaxation of the hukou in some cities, making it easier for rural workers to migrate to and 
stay longer in cities. 
Women make up a substantial proportion (at least one-third) of this rural–urban migrant 
population (footnote 98), and women and men are equally represented among migrants 
18–21 years of age.103 There are several notable features of the gendered migration flows. 
First, despite equal numbers of young women and men migrating, there are gender 
differences in the reasons for migration that point to the importance of gendered  
norms regarding expectations of sons and daughters. Y. Chiang, E. Hannum, and  
G. Kao (footnote 103) report that young women are more likely than young men to 
report altruistic or family reasons for migrating over personal development and individual 
100 Migration as percentage of the urban population = 273.95/749.16*100; migration as a percentage of the national 
economically active population = 273.95/796.90*100. The economically active population is defined as “the 
population aged 16 and over who are capable of working, are participating in or willing to participate in economic 
activities, including employed persons and unemployed persons” (footnote 13, Explanatory Notes). The number of 
migrants is from NBS (footnote 15); urban population and economically active population are from NBS (footnote 13, 
Tables 2-7 and 4-1).
101 S. Li, C. Luo, and T. Sicular. 2013. Overview: Income Inequality and Poverty in China, 2002–2007. In S. Li, H. Sato 
and T. Sicular, eds. Rising Inequality in China: Challenges to a Harmonious Society. New York: Cambridge University 
Press (pp. 44–84). The CHIP data set is one of the major sources of data on migrant workers. However, it is subject 
to some bias as, e.g., the 2002 survey showed that 60% of migrant workers were self-employed, a figure which is 
widely considered to be over-estimated. Urban income is measured by including migrant income and using the CHIP 
definition of income. Excluding migrant workers from the average urban wage calculation and/or using NBS definitions 
of income change the figures slightly, but does not alter the general point. 
102 J. Knight, Q. Deng, and S. Li. 2011. The Puzzle of Migrant Labour Shortage and Rural Labour Surplus in China. China 
Economic Review. 22 (4). pp. 586–600.
103 Y. Chiang, E. Hannum, and G. Kao. 2015. It’s not just about the money: gender and youth migration from rural China. 
China Sociological Review. 47 (2). pp. 177–201. The sex composition of migrants has varied over time. In the 1980s, it 
was predominantly women who migrated, but this changed in the 1990s and from 2000 to 2009 for a multitude of 
reasons. See footnote 99, pp. 8–9.
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income gain (see also Z. Zheng, based on All-China Women’s Federation data).104 
Second, women and men migrants also have different reasons for returning home that 
illustrate the continued importance of gender norms, especially caregiving for women and 
“breadwinning” for men. Among women migrants, the top three reasons for returning home 
are getting married, taking care of children (in school), and taking care of family members; 
among men migrants, the top three reasons are not making enough money, not satisfied 
with job, and having better opportunities at home (footnote 104). Almost half of returned 
migrants plan to migrate again (footnote 104), indicating the circular and temporary notion 
of migration.
Third, family migration is increasing, and migrant mothers experience particularly difficult 
choices in balancing paid work and unpaid care work. This likely arises because migrant 
mothers cannot rely on grandparents to provide care, unlike mothers with an urban hukou, 
and mothers in rural areas. Further, migrant mothers are less likely to be able to access 
publicly provided childcare, compared with mothers who have an urban hukou.
That women constitute a significant part of  the migrant population is attributed to a 
number of factors, including the Marriage Law, introduced in 1950, and the growth of labor-
intensive export manufacturing (footnote 23). By providing the legal footing for individual 
consent to be the basis of marriage, the Marriage Law freed young women from the 
authority of their fathers and families, and transformed social and geographic mobility for 
women (footnote 24, pp. 1–2; see also ILO, and Z. Zheng [footnote 104]). On the demand 
side, the post-1978 expansion of export-led manufacturing provided many of the new 
employment opportunities in coastal regions.105 
These legal and social norms enabling women to move freely in social spaces, together with the 
export-led growth strategy, resulted in relatively high levels of female labor force participation 
(higher than in other Asian countries). These levels have been described as a sign of the 
“emancipation of China’s adult women” Footnote 26, p. 4.. In important respects, the PRC’s 
export-led growth can also be described as “female-led growth,” given the prominence of 
young, female migrant workers in key export sectors. However, as documented below, women 
typically migrate to lower-quality jobs with lower pay and continue to face discrimination in 
the workforce. That women are better able to participate in the labor force than those in some 
other countries should not disguise the conditions under which much of that participation 
takes place.  
Data limitations notwithstanding, some studies provide insights into the characteristics of 
migrant workers from a gender perspective. The characteristics of female migrant workers 
using the 2004 Rural Household Survey106 and using a 1% microsample of the 2000 Census 
(footnote 23 p. 4) are shown in Table 3.
104 Z. Zheng. 2016. Rural–urban migration in gender and development perspectives: a case of China. Presentation at the 
ADB and ILO Workshop Promoting Gender Equality in the PRC: Gender, Labour and Migration, 17–18 November 
2016. Beijing: Normal University.  
105 The migration of workers from inland to coastal provinces was facilitated in myriad ways by sending and receiving 
provincial authorities, and by informal and private channels. These mechanisms and policies, except for the national 
hukou policy framework, are not considered here. For a systematic analysis of government policy interventions see 
ILO (forthcoming) China Labour Market Profile. See also X. Dong, S. Li, and S. Yang. 2016. Trade Liberalization, Social 
Policy Development and Labour Market Outcomes of Chinese Women and Men in the Decade After China’s 
Accession to the World Trade Organization. Discussion Paper No.9. New York: UN Women (February), for a discussion 
of policies aimed at mitigating the impacts of trade liberalization. 
106 ADB. 2008. People’s Republic of China: Urban Poverty Strategy II. Consultant’s report. Manila (TA 4694-PRC). 
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Table 3: Characteristics of Women Migrant Workers,  
2004 Rural Household Survey and 2000 Census
2004 Rural Household Survey (ADB 2008) 2000 Census (ADB 2015)
Women’s share 34% of migrant workers are women; a 
higher percentage (37%) of migrants in 
the coastal region are women. In some 
areas, such as Shenzhen and the Pearl 
River Delta, women constitute a large 
majority of migrant workers.
Age 62% of female migrant workers are 
15–24 years old. 
Heavily concentrated among the young.
Age (compared 
with male 
migrants)
Compared with male migrant workers, 
women migrant workers are younger and 
more likely to be unmarried.
Age (compared 
with rural female 
labor force)
The median age of a female migrant 
worker is 15.1 years younger than her 
counterpart in the rural labor force.
Education 
(compared with 
male migrants)
Educational levels of female migrant 
workers are significantly lower than 
those of their male counterparts.
Within the migrant population, women 
form the majority at lower levels of 
(migrant) education, and men for the 
majority at higher levels of (migrant) 
education. 
Education 
(compared 
with women in 
the destination 
population)
Women migrants have lower educational 
qualifications than nonmigrant women 
in the destination population.
Migration 
destinations
Migrant workers (men and women) from 
the coastal region are overwhelmingly 
more likely to go to other areas within 
the coastal region; workers migrating to 
the coastal region, from any destination, 
are likely to have a longer duration of 
migration, compared with migrants to 
noncoastal regions (with 66% staying 
over 9 months).
Reasons for 
migrating
Work and marriage are the main reasons for 
migrating for women under 35 years of age. 
However, women’s labor force participation 
is high notwithstanding their motivation for 
migrating. For example, although 28% of 
15–24-year olds state that marriage is their 
reason for migrating, 85% were nevertheless 
in the labor force (ADB 2015, p. 37). Marriage 
is also seen as a way of gaining access to a 
different (better) labor market.
ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Sources: ADB. 2008. People’s Republic of China: Urban Poverty Strategy II. Consultant’s report. Manila (TA 4694-PRC); and 
ADB. 2015. Female Labor Force Participation in Asia: China Country Study. Manila.
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Data from the 2010 Census suggests that there were changes over time in the composition 
of the female migrant labor force, which led to some modification of the findings 
summarized in Table 3 and Box 1. First, the importance of marriage as a motive for migration 
has decreased in importance for women migrants (footnote 99). Evidence indicates that 
marriage as the motivation for migrating decreased in importance among people who 
legally change their hukou status. In 2000, about 20% of all women migrants cited marriage 
as the reason for their migration, but in 2010, only 8% of women did so. The proportion 
citing work as the motive for migration increased from 25% to 39% between the two 
censuses (footnote 27, Table 1-8). Second, the age distribution of the migrant population 
changed, with female migrants becoming older, on average. While young migrants still 
dominate, with 41% of female migrants found in the 15–29 age group, the proportion of 
female migrants in the 40–59 age group was 22%, according to the 2010 Census. The 
corresponding figures from the 2000 Census were 58% and 11%, respectively (footnote 27, 
Table 1–9).  
Box 1 describes the characteristics of a representative male and female migrant worker, 
based on the 2004 Rural Household Survey. 
Data from NBS’s National Monitoring Report of Migrant Workers 2015 (footnote 98) also 
points to the changing demographics of the migrant workforce. Unfortunately, this data is 
not gender disaggregated, but the figures for the entire adult population confirm the trend 
noted above. In terms of the age of migrant workers, the proportions in 2015 (2011 data in 
parentheses) were: ages 16–20, 3.7% (6.3%); ages 21–30, 29.2% (32.7%); ages 31–40, 22.3% 
(22.7%); ages 41–50, 26.9% (24.0%); and ages over 50, 17.9% (14.3%). The rapid aging of 
the migrant workforce is clear even over this short 5-year period. The standard picture of a 
young migrant workforce in the 1990s is no longer accurate.107 The relative importance of 
the service sector compared with manufacturing as a destination employment for migrant 
workers has also increased over time (footnote 99, p. 22). 
107 Data for 2015 also show that, of the 277.5 million migrant workers, 168.9 million were classified as “long distance” 
migrants and 108.6 million as “short distance” migrants, with the latter group showing the higher growth rate (although 
the annual growth rate of migrant workers fell from 4.4% in 2011 to 1.3% in 2015).
Box 1: Representative Migrant Workers
“The median female migrant is young, just over 22 years of age. She entered the labor force at 15 upon finishing 
the lower middle school, or after 9 years of basic education. She left to work in a city soon after her 20th birthday. 
Her sojourn as a migrant worker ended after a few years later upon marriage. The median male migrant worker 
is 27.7 years old, almost 6 years older than his female counterpart. It is likely he also finished education after the 
middle school but with some possibility of a period in the higher-middle school stream. He left to work in a city 
a few years later than his female counterpart. Unlike with her, marriage did not mark a major break in his stint as 
a migrant worker. Further, his work history consisted of an alternating sequence of work spells in the city and the 
countryside.” 
Source: ADB. 2008. People’s Republic of China: Urban Poverty Strategy II. Consultant’s report. Manila (p. 41). 
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Evidence from the (Longitudinal Survey on) Rural Urban Migration in China (RUMIC) 
shows strongly that migrant workers prefer nearby migration destinations.108 Inducing 
migrants to move further from their home areas, therefore, requires a higher wage premium. 
Using the RUMIC survey data, J. Zhang and Z. Zhao109 report that, in the 15 cities surveyed, 
about half of rural–urban migrants came from the same province. The preference for 
shorter distance migration is found among all migrants, but it is slightly higher for women, 
or, as J. Zhang and Z. Zhao reported, “it is a bit easier to induce male than female migrants 
to move further away from home.” Their results also show that “female migrants like 
larger cities, greener cities, and cities with lower air pollution more than male migrants” 
(footnote 109, p. 23).
4.4  Gender, Decent Work, and the 
Structural Transition
4.4.1  Migration and the Segmented Urban Labor Market
The urban labor market is clearly segmented: workers with an urban hukou hold better jobs 
than workers with a rural hukou, and migrant workers in urban areas earn lower wages than 
workers with an urban hukou. X. Meng (footnote 95, p. 91) reports that the average hourly 
wage of migrant workers is 45% of the hourly wage of workers with an urban hukou, and that 
from 2002 to 2008, while the average real wage of migrants increased, it fell relative to the 
increase in the average wage of workers with an urban hukou. This suggests a deteriorating 
position for migrants relative to urban residents. 
Unlike people with an urban hukou, migrants have little access to healthcare services, 
education services for their children, and unemployment and poverty support 
(footnote 95, p. 88). Migrants have less access to social security insurance programs 
than urban workers because of the industrial and enterprise segregation by hukou status, 
and they are less likely to have contracts and, therefore, are less likely to qualify for social 
security provisions. Even when migrants have contracts, eligibility for pensions is limited 
because they cannot meet the threshold requirements, often due to changing employers. 
Long working hours are prevalent among migrant workers: 43% of employed migrant 
workers work more than 48 hours per week, whereas about 26% of employed workers 
with an urban hukou work this long.110 
It can be argued that many migrant workers suffer from poor working conditions, affecting 
both women and men, so these should be framed as rural–urban issues rather than gender 
issues. It is certainly the case that working conditions for men and women migrant workers 
both involve large decent work deficits, and that improvements are needed for both groups. 
However, a gender lens is also important for two reasons. First, some issues and experiences 
are more relevant to women than men, and a gender lens is able to highlight these. Second, 
108 J. Zhang and Z. Zhao. 2013. Measuring the Income–Distance Tradeoff for Rural–Urban Migrants in China. IZA 
Discussion Paper, No. 7160. Bonn. (January). The (Longitudinal Survey on) Rural Urban Migration in China (RUMIC) is 
sometimes referred to as the Rural Urban Migration in China and Indonesia data set. This data set includes a specific 
Migrant Household Survey. Begun in 2008, it has been administered over five waves, although data analysis has, 
thus, far been primarily based on the first two waves, M. Akgüç et al. 2014. The RUMIC Longitudinal Survey: Fostering 
Research on Labor Markets in China. IZA Journal of Labor & Development. 3 (5). pp. 2–14. 
109 J. Zhang and Z. Zhao, footnote 140, p. 2.
110 NBS. 2014. China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 3-30).
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even where there has been a “gender convergence,” this may be because male working 
conditions have been lowered to become comparable with women’s. As D. Grimshaw and  
J. Rubery argued, “progressive gender equality assumes women’s employment conditions 
are leveled up to those of men, not men’s leveled down with women’s” (footnote 26,  
p. 716.). To the extent that there has been gender convergence based on a leveling down, 
improving women’s working conditions can benefit all workers. Therefore, while a gender 
approach is used here, this should not be taken to imply that improvements in migrant 
men’s working conditions are not needed, too.
4.4.2 Migration, Segmentation, and Gender
The migration of large numbers of young, unmarried women to urban areas in search 
of employment has many contradictory elements. The ability of young women to move 
geographically and to feel safe in public places without male accompaniment (and perhaps 
permission) is seen as emancipating; a sign that women own their bodies, and are not 
subject to the restrictive patriarchal social norms experienced by women in some other 
Asian societies (footnote 23). Further, the ability to earn cash income provides women 
with a source of autonomy in ways that unpaid farm labor and care work in their rural home 
counties do not. 
Women Migrant Workers: at the Bottom of the Ladder
While these arguments point to the positive position of migrant women in the PRC 
compared with women in other Asian countries, other research is concerned with the 
position of migrant workers relative to others in the PRC. In this context, migrant workers 
are often referred to as “marginalized”.111 Using the RUMIC data set, A. Akay et al. found 
that migrants report lower levels of average subjective well-being than urban and rural 
residents.112 After controlling other determinants of well-being, no gender differences were 
found for women except for migrant women, for whom being female has a negative and 
significant effect (footnote 112). In other words, while migrants have the lowest levels of 
reported subjective well-being, women migrants have statistically significant lower levels of 
subjective well-being than migrant men, making them the least-satisfied group of the PRC 
population. 
 While remittances may be thought of as decreasing the material well-being of migrants 
since these reduce their disposable income, A. Akay et al. find that all migrants derive 
satisfaction from sending remittances home, and women more so than men (footnote 112, 
p. 11). However, this may reflect greater internalization of filial duty by daughters.
Migrants are much less likely to be employed in the state sector than the private sector. 
In 2009, 92% of women migrants and 87% of men migrants were employed in the private 
sector. In comparison, for workers with an urban hukou, 49% of women and 43% of men 
are employed in the private sector (based upon the Rural Urban Migration in China and 
Indonesia Migrant and Urban Survey (footnote 95, Table 2). 
111 D. Wong, C. Li, and H. Song. 2007. Rural Migrant Workers in Urban China: Living a Marginalized Life. International 
Journal of Social Welfare. 16. pp. 32–40.
112 A. Akay, O. Bargain, and K. Zimmermann. 2012. Relative Concerns of Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. 81. pp. 424.
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Women and men migrants are less likely than workers with an urban hukou to be employed 
in higher level occupations, such as the professional and managerial sectors. About 87% 
of women migrants (and 90% of men migrants) are employed in the two lowest-paying 
occupations, sales or service workers and production workers, compared with 42% of 
women workers (and 39% of men workers) with an urban hukou (footnote 95). 
Women migrants experience substantially unequal treatment in terms of wages. While 
migrants earn lower wages than workers with an urban hukou, women migrants earn 
less than men migrants. E. Magnani and R. Zhu estimate that, in 2002, men migrants 
earned 30.2% more than women migrants, in terms of their average hourly wage, based 
upon the CHIP data.113 Further, the gender wage gap among migrants is greater than the 
gender wage gap among workers with an urban hukou, which E. Magnani and R. Zhu 
(footnote 113, p. 784) estimate to be 18.1%. 
E. Magnani and R. Zhu further argue that the gender wage gap is greater at higher wage 
levels, which indicates a glass ceiling for migrant women workers, and contrasts with the 
“sticky floor” phenomenon for urban workers referred to earlier. There is also a high degree 
of gender wage discrimination among migrant workers, as for all urban workers, that cannot 
be explained by differences in endowments between men and women, including education 
level and work experience. Nonetheless, education endowments account for a greater 
share of the gender wage gap at higher levels (footnote 113). 
The relatively low subjective well-being of migrant women shown by survey data is 
consistent with many industry case studies of women’s working conditions in the textile and 
electronics industries. N. Pun has extensively analyzed the situation of young, unmarried 
women migrant workers, who are part of a “dormitory labor regime”.114 According to this 
analysis, based on fieldwork in southeastern PRC, it is argued that tying paid work to factory 
accommodation facilitates both the long hours of work faced by women migrant workers, 
and the close control over their labor so that it can be used as and when needed. The 
patriarchal control of women’s labor remains, but it is now exercised by factory managers 
rather than by fathers and brothers in the countryside. This reinforces the argument that 
it is necessary to look beyond relatively high female labor force participation in the PRC to 
consider the quality of work being offered to women, and the conditions under which it is 
being performed.
Many point to the role of hukou as a policy that restricts permanent mobility and results in 
disadvantages for migrant workers. Over 70% of the PRC’s population has rural hukou status 
(footnote 95). However, C. Chan et al. also argue that policy played a key role in facilitating 
migration through the state’s withdrawal of social provisions in rural areas, openness to 
113 E. Magnani and R. Zhu. 2012. Gender Wage Differentials among Rural-Urban Migrants in China. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 42. p. 782.
114 N. Pun. 2005. Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace. Durham and London: Duke University 
Press; N. Pun. 2007. Gendering the Dormitory Labor System: Production, Reproduction, and Migrant Labor in South 
China. Feminist Economics. 13 (3–4). pp. 239–258; N. Pun and H. Lu. 2010. Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger, 
and Class Action among the Second Generation of Peasant-Workers in Present-Day China. Modern China. 36 (5). 
pp. 493–519; and N. Pun and C. Smith. 2007. Putting Transnational Labor Process in its Place: The Dormitory Labor 
Regime in Post-Socialist China. Work, Employment and Society. 21 (1). pp. 27–45.
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foreign investment, and close state–business ties that led the local levels of government to 
be actively engaged in the recruitment and mobility of migrant workers.115
Therefore, migration exposed large numbers of women to poor employment conditions, 
which raises questions about their access to decent work. At the same time, the large-scale 
employment of migrant women also provided a basis for forms of collective action and 
voice. As labor disputes escalated, migrant women workers were part of the spontaneous 
reactions to grievances such as unpaid wages, inadequate pay increases, enforced overtime, 
and factory layoffs (footnote 115). These actions were evident through increasing labor 
assertiveness and indicate rising empowerment and voice, although case studies found 
that men migrant workers and technicians are more often the leaders, with women workers 
nevertheless participating (C. Chan and N. Pun).116
Second-Generation Women Migrants: New Expectations, Similar Problems
There has been a significant change in the attitude and behavior of the second-generation 
of women migrant workers, that is, those born in the reform period and whose migration 
occurred from the late 1990s onward. This new generation of migrant workers (both 
women and men) are typically better educated than their predecessors, have greater 
access to news and information through new technology, have higher aspirations, are often 
more materialistic and individualistic, have less loyalty to their employers, and expect their 
rights to be better protected.117 The New Contract Labor Law, introduced in 2008, was 
instrumental in making workers more aware of their rights, although this is more so for 
better-educated workers, both local and migrant.118 Interestingly, women are more likely to 
be aware of the labor law provisions than men (footnote 117, p. 17). 
Despite the changes in the attitude and behavior of the second-generation of women 
migrant workers, their relative position has not necessarily improved in many respects.119 
While their wages increased (along with wages generally, including minimum wage 
increases), rural migrant women’s wages did not increase in the same way as those for 
other groups. They are determined by a variety of factors including job type, industry, and 
ownership, showing the continued importance of labor market segregation in pushing 
rural migrant women into low-paying sectors such as social services. Studies indicate that 
migrant women have limited prospects of moving up job ladders.120 The gender earnings 
115 C. Chan et al. 2010. The Role of the State, Labor Policy and Migrant Workers’ Struggles in Globalized China. Global 
Labor Journal.1 (1). pp. 132–151.
116 In the section on migration, data from surveys, such as the RUMIC, were used wherever possible. However, in 
discussing some issues such as protest activity and social protection provisions, reliance is placed on one or a few 
specific case studies. Of course, the latter may not be representative and point to areas where more research to add to 
the body of knowledge would be beneficial. Read this section bearing in mind this important caveat. 
117 J. Chan. 2013. A Suicide Survivor: The Life of a Chinese Worker. New Technology, Work and Employment. 28 (2). 
p. 95; and N. Pun and H. Lu. 2010. Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger, and Class Action among the Second 
Generation of Peasant-Workers in Present-Day China. Modern China. 36 (5). p. 495.
118 M. Gallagher et al. 2013. China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law: Implementation and Implications for China’s Workers. IZA 
Discussion Paper. No. 7555. August. p. 10.
119 Another area for fruitful future research would be a comparison of the types of employment gained by first and 
second generation migrant women workers, whether that obtained by the second generation is an improvement, and 
whether first generation women migrants also have access to those jobs. Research on gender and migrants might also 
address issues such as housing conditions, transport and safety, and work–marriage patterns. 
120 S. Kanji et al. 2015. How Have Women Fared with China’s Rise in Global Supply Chain Trade? PowerPoint presentation. 
slide 9.
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gap among migrant workers rose from 4% in 1995 to 23% in 2002, before falling slightly 
to 21% in 2008.121 Migrant women’s earnings clearly failed to keep pace with those of 
migrant men; and migrant workers’ hourly wages are less than half of those of their urban 
counterparts (footnote 95, p. 91). This again places rural migrant women, especially those 
with lower education levels, at the bottom of the earnings league. The large numbers  
of relatively poorly educated migrant women competing for a restricted range of jobs in 
urban areas may be one cause of the failure of their wages to keep pace with those of 
migrant men. 
Gender and the Left-Behind: the Impacts of Migration on Left-Behind Elderly 
Women and Girls 
This life story also raises the issue of the well-being of those “left behind” when rural 
workers migrate for urban jobs. That is, what is the gendered impact on the estimated 
60 million plus children “left behind,” and on spouses and parents who remain in rural areas 
when an adult family member migrates?122
This report has so far analyzed gender predominantly at the level of the individual. 
However, migration clearly has gendered impacts on the family and larger household that 
must also be considered. The impact of out-migration is significant and gendered, with the 
increase in work time being greater for elderly women and girls than for elderly men and 
boys.123 Specifically, it is reported that, where an adult family member migrates (typically 
the father in the case of this study), both elderly women and men face increased farm and 
off-farm work hours, although they are greater for women than men. There is no change 
in work time for left-behind boys, but girls face increases in farm work and domestic labor. 
Given the size of the time increases, the study concludes that “the increase in work time 
121 Y. Cui, D. Nahm, and M. Tani. 2013. Earnings Differentials and Returns to Education in China, 1995–2008. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 7349. April. p. 13.
122 Official sources estimate that there are 61 million left-behind children. Another study estimates that there were 10.85 
million left-behind married women in 2000 (footnote 99, p. 11).
123 H. Chang, X. Dong, and F. MacPhail. 2011. Labor Migration and Time Use Patterns of the Left-Behind Children and 
Elderly in Rural China. World Development. 39 (12). pp. 2,199–2,210.
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Box 2: Worker Alienation and the Personal Costs of Migration
The alienating and atomizing effects of factory work are also still present, as a spate of individual worker suicides 
in 2010 showed. An interview, reported by J. Chan, with one suicide attempt survivor, a young female factory 
worker in Shenzhen, illustrates that many of the same issues still affect second generation migrant workers. The 
woman was brought up by relatives in her rural home, because her parents had migrated to cities in search of 
work since farming did not provide a sufficient income for their family. The young woman migrated, at 17, to the 
Foxconn factory in Shenzhen where she joined a workforce of hundreds of thousands. Removed from social 
networks, working 12-hour days, and heavily monitored at work to ensure high productivity, she attempted 
suicide after just over 1 month, following an administrative error that left her unpaid. She survived, but is now 
paralyzed. 
Source:  J. Chan. 2013. A Suicide Survivor: The Life of a Chinese Worker. New Technology, Work and Employment. 28 (2). pp. 84–99.
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is particularly large for elderly women, suggesting that loss of household labor through 
migration has been compensated for primarily by elderly women” (footnote 123, p. 2,203). 
Though work time for left-behind boys does not change, other research found that, when 
fathers migrate, boys’ enrollment in school decreases; a result attributed to the absence 
of a disciplining father.124 However, the impacts of migration on left-behind children are 
complex, and other research finds that the migration of both parents (rather than either 
one) results in lower cognitive development among primary age left-behind children, 
although the results are not disaggregated by children’s gender.125 The impact of migration 
on the education of left-behind children is ambiguous because, while parental absence may 
reduce familial input regarding education, this may be offset by migrant parent remittances. 
The impact of migration on the human capital formation of left-behind children needs 
more research, especially on gendered impacts. 
The effects of parental migration on left-behind children extend beyond direct influences 
on education and human capital formation. Studies also found higher rates of depression 
among left-behind children. One study showed that the risks of depression are higher 
the earlier in the child’s life that the parent migrated, especially where the mother or 
both parents migrate.126 Another study showed that depression rates were higher among 
left-behind fourth to sixth graders.127 While the study found no gender differences in the 
incidence of depression among the left-behind children, it reported different patterns of 
time use by boys and girls (with the latter spending more time watching TV and consuming 
sweet drinks). No differences were reported among children left behind by mother, father, 
or both parents. For left-behind children, who might typically only see their parents once a 
year at Spring Festival, social support networks were found to be important determinants 
of depression, with those in the lower-income households typically having fewer social 
supports to draw upon and higher resulting levels of depression.  
The effects of the length of time migrants leave children behind were also investigated, with 
long-term migration negatively related to children’s health and education outcomes. The 
negative impacts on child health and education are reported to be graver when mothers 
rather than fathers migrate.128 Clearly, migration has significant effects on left-behind 
children, but more research is needed on the gender dimensions (i.e., the impacts of 
mothers and/or fathers migrating on left-behind boys and girls).  
Of course, not all children of migrant workers are left behind, and many live with their 
migrating parents in urban areas. However, research on this found that women face “harsh 
choices.” They must choose between earning income and their children’s well-being, since 
124 S. Wang. 2014. The Effect of Parental Migration on the Educational Attainment of Their Left-Behind Children in Rural 
China. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. 14 (3). pp. 1,037–1,080.
125 H. Zhang et al. 2014. Does Parental Absence Reduce Cognitive Achievements? Evidence from Rural China. Journal of 
Development Economics 111. pp. 181–195.
126 Z. Liu, X. Li, and X. Gao. 2009. Left Too Early: The Effect of Age of Separation from Parents on Chinese Rural 
Children’s Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression. American Journal of Public Health. 99. pp. 2,049–2,054.
127 B. He et al. 2012. Depression Risk of “Left-Behind” Children in Rural China. Psychiatry Research. 200 (2–3).  
pp. 306–312.
128 X. Meng and C. Yamauchi. 2015. Children of Migrants: The Impact of Parental Migration on Their Children’s Education 
and Health Outcomes. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9165. June. pp. 19–20.
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the childcare they can afford is of low quality. It is not surprising that as a husband’s income 
increases, so does the probability that a married migrant woman will leave the labor force 
(footnote 35, p. 957).
4.5  Gender, Migration, and the Next Phase 
of the Structural Transition 
The patterns of migration that have dominated the past 2 decades are beginning to 
change. Manufacturing in the coastal provinces was affected by the renminbi appreciating 
by approximately 25% since 2005, rising real labor costs that have been growing at over 
10% per year, and slowing global demand following the global financial crisis in 2008. 
The impact has squeezed profit margins and led firms to respond in two ways. The more 
labor-intensive industries increasingly looked to relocate inland or overseas for sources of 
lower-cost labor. The more technologically intensive industries that remain in economic 
zones in the coastal regions sought to adapt to these conditions. Both emerging trends have 
implications for women’s, particularly migrant women’s, employment prospects. 
The relocation of industries overseas is driven by the desire to find lower labor costs in 
neighboring countries such as Cambodia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam. Since, as shown 
above, migrant women are disproportionately represented in the low-paying manufacturing 
sectors, this industrial relocation will have gendered impacts, with women’s jobs being 
disproportionately eliminated.129
The relocation of industries inland was driven by the same issue of rising labor costs in 
the coastal regions, where “surplus labor” was increasingly reduced and wage rates rose 
accordingly. This relocation was facilitated by local (provincial and municipal) inland 
governments seeking to attract industries to their jurisdictions with new infrastructure 
projects and economic incentives. In addition, national policies sought to facilitate the 
employment of the “new generation of migrant workers” in the key regional and other cities 
of the inland provinces.130 
Changing patterns of industrial location are documented by J. Zhang,131 who argues that this 
trend of “inland-oriented industrial relocation” accelerated after the global financial crisis, 
as firms sought to restore profitability. This has not only affected the Chengdu–Chongqing 
and Wuhan regions, but also inland provinces where the shares of manufacturing value-
added increased.132 That is, rural–urban migration and urbanization will both increase in the 
129 Standard Chartered Bank. 2015. PRD’s Pain, China and ASEAN’s Gain. Global Research: Special Report: reports the 
results of surveys showing that firms are increasingly looking to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries 
to relocate their manufacturing, given rising wages in the PRC (especially in the Pearl River Delta region, which was 
long the driver of internal migration flows). The gendered labor market impact of this trend needs further research. 
130 H. Wang, L. Pan, and N. Heerink. 2013. Working Conditions and Job Satisfaction of China’s New Generation of Migrant 
Workers: Evidence from an Inland City. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7405. May.
131 J. Zhang. 2014. Global Economic Crisis and the “Spatial Fix” of China’s World Factory: The Great “Long March” Inland. 
In Y. Atasoy, ed. Global Economic Crisis and the Politics of Diversity. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (p. 139).
132 For discussion of the efforts of Chongqing to attract inward flows, see P. Huang. 2011. Chongqing: Equitable 
Development Driven by a “Third Hand”? Modern China. 37 (6). pp. 569–622; also footnote 131.
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future, but the location of migrant destination cities is likely to be more diverse, with less 
emphasis on the coastal provinces.133 
For women migrant workers, this emerging trend has potentially contradictory impacts. 
On the one hand, the increased employment in inland areas would benefit women, who 
prefer to work closer to their home areas (footnote 108), and enable them to keep in 
closer contact with their families. The “long march” inland by firms (footnote 131) may 
result in a shorter march for migrant workers. J. Chan (footnote 117) points to the role 
that greater local social networks can play in increasing migrant workers’ well-being and 
bargaining strength. One study of migrant workers in an inland city, Guiyang, undertaken 
by H. Wang, L. Pan, and N. Heerink (footnote 130), found that second-generation migrants 
report higher levels of job satisfaction than first-generation migrants, despite receiving 
comparable levels of pay. They attribute this to their greater willingness to assert their 
rights and to move between employers, which resulted in their having “more insurance 
at work, receiv[ing] significantly more on-the-job training, conduct[ing] less dangerous 
or toxic work, and receiv[ing] more regular health checks than the traditional generation” 
(footnote 130, p. 13). While they find no gender differences in these findings, their study 
does highlight the importance of working conditions, insurance, and health provisions for 
the well-being of migrant workers, both female and male. More studies of migrant workers 
in emerging inland city destinations would be beneficial.
Incorporating social insurance provisions into compensation measures is also important 
for understanding the position of migrant workers compared with their urban counterparts. 
In a study of labor market discrimination against migrant workers, L. Lee found that, 
while wage discrimination is relatively low, discrimination is increased substantially if 
bonuses and insurance coverage are included in the workers’ compensation measure.134 
Interestingly, from the perspective of the impacts of industrial relocation discussed here, 
the study also found wide regional variation in the extent of discrimination against migrant 
workers, with the highest levels in the coastal cities of Shanghai and Fuzhou, and much 
lower or nonexistent levels in the inland cities of Wuhan and Xi’an, and the northern city of 
Shenyang. This suggests that the relocation of industry may benefit migrant workers. The 
effect on migrant workers by sex is a topic in need of further research as firms relocate and 
the centers of migration change. 
It is important to note that social insurance provisions for migrant workers lagged 
considerably historically behind those of other workers, in large part due to the hukou 
system. The low rates of migrant workers’ insurance coverage, and their generally inferior 
access to and standards of health, housing, and education are well-documented.135 A study 
133 Evidence on changes in the spatial distribution of migrants in the PRC’s 50 largest cities from 2000 to 2010 supports 
this view. M. Lu and Y. Xia (footnote 97, p. 14) report that “the proportion of the country’s total migrants in the 
southeast coastal cities somewhat declined” whereas migration increased in cities such as Chongqing and some 
western cities. Migration was more scattered between these cities in 2010 than in 2000. 
134 The results showed that discrimination increased from approximately 10% to 28% once other compensation 
measures were included. The estimated discrimination against migrant workers was higher for men (at 34%) than for 
women (at 22%). L. Lee. 2012. Decomposing Wage Differentials between Migrant Workers and Urban Workers in 
Urban China’s Labor Markets. China Economic Review. 23 (2). pp. 461–470.
135 Footnote 137; Z. Zheng. 2016. Rural–urban migration in gender and development perspectives: a case of China. 
Presentation at the ADB and ILO Workshop Promoting Gender Equality in the PRC: Gender, Labour, and Migration, 
17–18 November 2016. Beijing: Beijing Normal University; also footnote 106.
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by X. Zhang et al.136 quotes national survey data on the proportion of migrants enrolled in 
various insurance schemes, as follows: old-age insurance at 11.9%, medical insurance at 
12.6%, unemployment insurance at 8.4%, and injury insurance at 23.1%. Among the reasons 
for this are the low pay of migrant workers, which makes them unable or reluctant to enroll, 
and policy design features that exclude migrant workers from participation. Unfortunately, 
these figures are not disaggregated by sex, and an important area for future research is 
whether there are gender biases in social insurance participation. While this issue is clearly 
relevant to all migrant workers, it remains to be seen if this is particularly the case for 
women migrant workers. 
It has generally been argued that discrimination in access to forms of social insurance has 
been decreasing in recent years (especially in larger cities) as policy changed, and that the 
presence of a labor contract is more important for insurance coverage than hukou status. 
However, when it comes to having a signed labor contract, Z. Cheng, I. Nielsen, and  
R. Smyth, in their study of Beijing, found that workers who migrate from one urban location 
to another, who are male, better educated, and employed in the state sector were most 
likely to have such a contract. Workers who migrate from rural to urban locations, are less-
educated, employed in the private sector, and female were least likely to have a contract 
and, hence, had less access to social insurance.137 
One study explicitly focusing on the gendered access to social insurance analyzed pension, 
work injury, and medical insurance.138 The analysis, based on four cities, showed the 
importance of location and industrial structure in determining participation in insurance 
schemes. Specifically, it found that, in cities that predominantly employ women migrant 
workers in the formal manufacturing sector (such as Shenzhen and Suzhou), women’s 
participation in insurance schemes is relatively high (from 35% to 53% of their sample), and 
higher than that of men migrant workers in the same city but whose industrial categories 
are more diverse. In more economically diversified cities such as Beijing, where services 
and construction are also dominant, migrant participation in insurance schemes was 
substantially lower, and higher for men than women migrants. 
Location and associated industrial categories, therefore, matter a great deal in determining 
both the levels of insurance coverage and the gender differences in participation. However, 
participation is low in the area of maternity insurance. None of the three schemes analyzed 
by J. Yao and B. Kim (the inclusive, independent, and comprehensive insurance models 
introduced to assist migrant workers) included maternity insurance, despite rural migrant 
workers facing higher maternal mortality risks than urban workers. Other features of the 
schemes also disadvantage migrant women. For example, firstly, the comprehensive model 
in Shanghai excludes workers in household services and therefore, disproportionately 
excludes rural migrant workers; and secondly, many women migrants who have less labor 
market attachment due to family reasons are excluded from the inclusive model’s pension 
insurance scheme because of the criterion that contributions must be made for 15 years 
(footnote 138, page 60). 
136 X. Zhang et al. 2009. Research Report on Old-Age Pension Insurance among Migrant Workers. Beijing: School of Social 
Development and Public Policy, Beijing Normal University.
137 Z. Cheng, I. Nielsen, and R. Smyth. 2014. Access to Social Insurance in Urban China: A Comparative Study of Rural–
Urban and Urban–Urban Migrants in Beijing. Habitat International. 41. pp. 243–252.
138 J. Yao and B. Kim. 2015, Social Insurance Participation of Rural Migrant Workers Based on Gender Dimension: 
Evidence from Four Chinese Cities. Asian Social Work and Policy Review. 9 (1). pp. 57–69.
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This analysis points to the importance of context and features of policy design. The 
relocation of manufacturing to inland cities may benefit female migrants, if it allows them 
to draw upon wider social networks closer to their homes. Social networks and connections 
were documented as being important for the well-being of female (and male) workers, 
and policy reform, such as that which facilitates shorter migrations in both distance and 
duration, contributes to maintaining the social fabric, and can benefit migrant workers. 
However, relocation may also push poor labor practices further from the international 
and national limelight, a spatial moving of the value chain, and reduce pressure on 
companies to improve working conditions. If inland cities exhibit state–capital relations 
less favorable to the signing of labor contracts, that too will negatively affect women 
migrant workers’ access to decent work provisions. It is too early to say which set of forces 
will be dominant, and where, and this is an area where monitoring and future research will 
be important.
The second part of this trend, the movement up the value chain of firms and industries 
remaining in the coastal regions, also has implications for migrant women. This 
movement is again a response to market factors, such as renminbi appreciation and rising 
real wages, and again facilitated by state policy. The central government’s programs to 
encourage technological progress and industrial upgrading are supported at provincial 
and city levels. This goal is in evidence in the PRC’s 5-year plans for the past decade. It 
was shown in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2005–2011) when National Development 
Reform Commission Minister Ma Kai noted that the PRC’s position as labour intensive 
exporter would “weaken” over time.139 The implication of this was that the PRC needs 
to upgrade its product mix. This was reinforced in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, with its 
desire to “promote industrial upgrading,” and the emphasis on innovation in the current 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan. 
Research by P. Bowles et al.140 shows that high-tech firms in the coastal province of 
Jiangsu have responded to the need to engage in industrial upgrading in four main ways by: 
introducing new products, increasing the technological level of machinery inputs, improving 
after sales service, and increasing research and development staff and adjusting the skilled 
labor complement. In the latter category, firms have, in various degrees, increased their 
hiring of engineering and other skilled staff (positions men tend to dominate) and, in 2013, 
women made up only 30.2% of the country’s scientific research and technical services 
personnel in urban units (Table 2). 
Some firms also reported raising the educational requirements of their production workers. 
Women in the manufacturing sector typically have lower education levels than men 
(Figure 13), so as firms increase their demand for more highly educated workers, many 
women may not have sufficient formal education.141
139 K. Ma. 2006. The 11th Five-Year Plan: Targets, Paths and Policy Orientation. http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-03/23/
content_234832.htm (accessed 19 March 2016).
140 P. Bowles et al. 2016. Multiple Challenges, Complex Impacts and Responses, Uncertain Futures: A Case Study of 
Exporters in Jiangsu Province, China. Report prepared for the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa. .
141 Comparing the data in Figure 13 with a decade earlier, average educational levels increased. However, gender 
differences became larger for those with junior and senior school education, and college-educated workers in the 
manufacturing sector. (footnote 16, Table 1–49.)
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Migrant women generally have lower education levels than women with an urban hukou. 
For example, over 70.0% of women migrants have junior high school education or less, 
compared with only 22.6% of women with urban hukou (calculated from X. Meng) 
(footnote 95, p. 90). Thus, employment opportunities for rural migrant women may be 
expected to become relatively scarcer, as industrial upgrading continues and/or their 
relative wages may be expected to fall further.
Some of the key features of the gendered impacts of the structural transition are 
summarized in Figure 14.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 1-36).
Figure 13: Distribution of Employed Workers in the Manufacturing  
Sector by Educational Attainment (%), Women and Men, 2013
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 Source: Author.
Figure 14: Gender, Work, and the Structural Transition
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5 The Growth Transition
5.1  General Features 
The structural transition, involving the shift from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors, has been complemented and reinforced by a “growth transition” since 
the turn of the new millenium. This growth transition refers to the shift in policy toward less 
reliance on export-led growth and a greater role for domestic, demand-led growth. This has 
been a policy driver since 2001 but recently has been more strongly emphasized. 
The PRC’s leadership indicated the need to “rebalance” the economy by changing its 
structure and growth path for well over a decade. These intentions are readily seen in 
the objectives of the past three 5-year plans. In the Twelfth 5-year plan (2011–2015), 
for example, policy was designed to “establish [the] long term mechanism of expanding 
domestic demand. Create [a] positive consumption environment by actively yet steadily 
accelerating urbanization, implementing the strategy of employment as [a] priority, 
deepening the distribution [of] reform and improving [the] social security system, gradually 
mak[ing] the overall size of our domestic market ranks among the largest internationally” 
(Twelfth 5-year plan, 2011).142 The Thirteenth 5-year plan also stresses the importance of 
the shift toward domestic consumption.
Much remains to be done to achieve this because, to date, the PRC’s growth has been 
driven primarily by investment and net exports.143 Policy continues to seek “rebalancing” 
of the economy and gives a greater role to domestic private consumption and the 
service sector as drivers of growth. The service sector remains significantly smaller than 
international comparators, with ADB noting that “in 2013, the share of services in GDP was 
46.1%, which is about 15 percentage points lower than an economy would generally reach 
at this level of GDP per capita. The share of employment in services (at 38.5%) also lags 
behind that of GDP and is below international norms” (footnote 22, p. 1). However, it is 
clear that the PRC’s policy makers desire an expanded domestic economy and an increasing 
role for the service sector, and efforts are being taken to achieve this. 
142 To these medium-term goals should be added the boost to domestic demand given by the short-term stimulus 
package introduced in response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
143 E. Prasad. 2009. Rebalancing Growth in Asia. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 15169. Cambridge, 
MA (July); P. Bowles. 2012. Rebalancing China’s Growth: Some Unsettled Questions. Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies. 33 (1). pp. 1–13.
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In urban units (rather than nationwide), the service sector is already a major employer 
for women, accounting for 57% of women’s employment in 2013 (footnote 15, Table 3-1). 
Given the importance of the service sector for urban women’s employment and likely 
future expansion, the role of women in the service sector is worthy of further analysis. That 
is, the change in growth orientation should be analyzed not only in sector terms (with the 
increasing importance of domestic demand and the service sector), but also through a 
gender lens that focuses on the impacts of the change in growth strategy on the quantity 
and quality of women’s employment in the expanding service sector.
5.2  Women’s Employment and the Growth 
Transition
The service sector, as with other sectors, has a gendered profile with women more likely to 
be found in some sectors than in others (Table 2).
Women comprise 35% of the total workforce (and in some service sectors, more than half 
of the workforce) in the urban units. Social norms continue to condition which service 
positions are accessible to women. 
Within the service sector, women are dominant in many of the lowest-paying sectors, a 
feature of industrial segregation also found in the manufacturing sector discussed earlier. 
For example, in the hotel and catering sector, women make up 56% of the workforce 
(1.7 million women), but the average wage in this sector is only 66% of the national average 
wage. Women make up 57% of workers in retail trade (2.8 million women), while the 
average wage is only 73% of the national average. In the male-dominated service industries 
such as information technology, where women make up only 39% of the workforce, 
average wages are 177% of the national average; and in scientific research and technical 
services, women make up only 30% of the workforce in a sector that pays 149% of the 
national average. There are some exceptions, however. Women make up 50.6% of financial 
intermediaries, where average wages are nearly twice the national average. Health services 
provide another exception. Unfortunately, data is not available on the distribution of job 
positions and salaries within these (or other) sectors (data drawn from Table 2.)
The presence of a glass ceiling for women and their exclusion from top occupations is 
striking. Women comprise only: 25% of “heads of government institutions, parties, civil 
societies, enterprises, public institutions” in 2010; only 34% of professional and technical 
staff in private enterprises; and 32% of board of directors in 2011 (footnote 27, Tables 3–3 
and 7–8, and Chart 73).  
To analyze the conditions of work further, this report focuses on two subsectors in which 
women are disproportionately employed—the retail and domestic service workers. These 
sectors illustrate some of the gender dimensions of service sector employment, although, 
since the subsectors may vary, these dimensions should not necessarily be taken as 
representative of all services subsectors.  
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5.3  Gender, Decent Work, and the Growth 
Transition
Retail Trade Subsector
Women are concentrated in the retail service sector, which underwent considerable change 
during the reform period as the transition to a consumer society and “modern” standards of 
customer service replaced uniformity. With this came a significant change in the gendered 
norms of work; the service sector is recognized in many countries as highly gendered, with 
the sale of goods dependent on the image of the workforce. A. Hanser argues that the 
service sector is not only characterized by broad patterns of gender segregation in labor 
markets, as documented earlier, but it also often involves work that is gendered because it 
draws on or reinforces gender norms and stereotypes about women and men.144 
In the case of the PRC, it is young, urban women who are the most prized employees and 
who are best able to take advantage of employment opportunities in the service sector. 
Research shows that managers view young, physically attractive, well-disciplined women as 
the ideal type to work in the up-market private retail sector, where a distinctive workforce 
is as important as the goods that are for sale. In contrast, middle-aged, blue collar service 
workers are more often found in the state stores. The street markets, especially clothing 
vendors, rely on highly sexualized women sellers (footnote 144, p. 586). 
Thus, the retail service sector is a growing place for female employment, but is a gendered 
and stratified sector. Services sector work involves sex segregation (relying on differences 
in the gendered construction of social norms between women’s and men’s work) and 
differences between women, with access to some service sector work restricted to women 
with particular characteristics (related to age, physical appearance, and residency). 
Therefore, equal employment opportunities are constrained for women in the service 
sector in several ways. The retail and restaurant sectors, both dominated by women, are 
also much less likely to provide a labor contract for migrant workers than employers in the 
manufacturing sector, although this finding is not found for local residents (footnote 117, 
pp. 13–14). 
Domestic Service to Households
Over 90% of domestic service workers are women, typically from rural areas.145 While age 
ranges vary, the majority of domestic workers are in their 30s and 40s, and they typically 
have relatively low education levels.146 There are an estimated 20 million domestic workers 
serving as housekeepers, nannies, and caregivers in the PRC.147 The sector is expanding as 
144 A. Hanser. 2012. Class and the Service Encounter: New Approaches to Inequality in the Service Workplace. Sociology 
Compass. 6 (4). p. 294.
145 International Domestic Workers Federation. 2013. Report on the Status of Domestic Workers and Decent Work 
Challenges in China. Geneva (December. p. 1).
146 ILO. Fact Sheet: Domestic Workers in China. Project to Promote Equality and Decent Work for Women through 
Trafficking Prevention, Protection for Domestic Workers, and Gender; (no date); also see footnote 145.
147 Official data on urban units, including from NBS (footnote 13), substantially underestimates employment in the 
category of paid work in private households as caregivers, because “urban units” do not include private enterprises  
and individual enterprises; also footnote 145.
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urban households become wealthier and as public- and employer-provided care services, 
such as childcare centers, declined.148 
Conditions of work often include low pay, long working hours (essentially being “on call” 
most of the time), no additional overtime pay, exposure to physical risk, and isolation. 
Survey evidence reveals that many workers receive less than 4 days off per month, are often 
paid less than the required legislated minimum wage, report wage arrears, and suffer from 
multiple sources of discrimination in the labor market.149 Examples of sexual harassment 
and conditions akin to forced labor have also been reported (footnote 145, p. 3). The 
poor working conditions are common to both live-in and live-out domestic workers, and 
those working as caregivers and cleaners; the conditions may differ depending on these 
specificities, but they can all be categorized as poor (footnote 145).
This can in part be explained by the ambiguous legal status of domestic workers. They 
are often hired through domestic work agencies, but are not employees of agencies; 
rather they enter into (often informal) agreements directly with employers. This leaves 
domestic workers unprotected since they are not classified as employees and do not 
benefit from coverage under the Labor Law or social security schemes. Therefore, this 
site of employment exhibits the characteristics of vulnerability and insecurity for many 
of its workers, notwithstanding efforts by several levels of government to formalize 
and professionalize the sector (footnote 117) (Shanghai has included eligibility for 
domestic workers, both domestic and migrant, in its social security system). However, the 
characterization of care and domestic work as “women’s work” and the private employment 
setting contribute to the poor working conditions of domestic workers.
This is a sector where, despite the current lack of legal protection, there are some agencies 
that can assist in promoting decent work among domestic workers (see footnote 16 for 
a definition of decent work). For example, the All-China Women’s Federation has 465 
domestic service agencies in 16 provinces and cities, and its advocacy work could play a 
greater role in giving voice to women’s employment concerns. The All China Federation of 
Trade Unions also set up a domestic workers’ union in Xi’an, which may be a pathway for 
increasing voice (footnote 145, p. 3). 
This raises a more general point about the need for organizational representation to 
advance women’s interests. International evidence shows that women union leaders face 
a “glass ceiling” and that more gender-balanced collective bargaining teams are needed to 
ensure that women’s strategic interests receive equal priority.150 This suggests that, while 
individual programs advanced by All-China Women’s Federation and All China Federation 
of Trade Unions may assist women care workers, more systemic changes to ensure women 
are adequately represented in state organizations are required.  
Therefore, the service sector is characterized by gendered industrial segregation based on 
social norms of what constitutes “women’s work.” These norms also play out in patterns of 
148 X. Hu. 2010. Paid Domestic Labor as Precarious Work in China. Doctoral dissertation. Simon Fraser University; also see 
footnote 145.
149 X. Dong, J. Feng, and Y. Yu. 2017. Relative Pay of Domestic Eldercare Workers in Shanghai Feminist Economics. 23 (1). 
pp. 135–159; also see footnote 117, pp. 2–3; and footnote 145.
150 Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV). Equality and Discrimination. Workers’ Activities Programme (ACTRAV) ILO 
International Training Centre. (no date).
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hiring in the retail sector, where different gender characteristics are found in different types 
of store, and in the paid domestic care service sector, where migrant women are among the 
lowest paid. The expansion of this sector as part of a growth transition poses significant 
challenges for women.   
Figure 15 gives a summary of the impacts of the growth transition on gender and work.
 Source: Author.
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6 The Demographic Transition 
6.1 General Features
The PRC experienced a demographic transition over the past 30 years, which most industrialized countries took over 100 years to complete (footnote 87, p. 2). The PRC’s 
population is rapidly aging, and a significant shift is underway in the elderly dependency 
rate, which over the past 15 years increased approximately by 40%, while the child 
dependency rate fell by 14% (Figure 16).
Note: The child dependency ratio is calculated as the percentage of the population 0–14 years of age to the 
population 15–64 years of age; the elderly dependency ratio is the percentage of population 65 years of age and 
older to the population 15–64 years of age. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 2015. China Statistical Yearbook 2015. Beijing: China Statistics Press 
(Table 2–4).
Figure 16: Dependency Ratio (%), Child and Elderly, 2000–2014
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The elderly population in the PRC is described as “expanding at a historically 
unprecedented fast rate” (footnote 22, p. 7). In 2010, there were 178 million people in 
the PRC 60 years of age and over. Based on United Nations projections, this number is 
expected to increase to 340 million by 2030 (accounting for 24% of the population), and 
440 million by 2050 (footnote 22, p. 7). A key gender question is: who is going to care for 
this growing group of elderly people? 
6.2  Gender and the Demographic Transition
With the changing demographic structure, less time may be needed for childcare, but more 
time will be needed for eldercare, both paid and unpaid. Social norms influence who is 
responsible for providing this care time. With respect to unpaid time, it is predominantly 
women’s responsibility to engage in eldercare, which will constrain their labor market 
participation (see Section 2 for estimates of the gender gap in unpaid work).
Labor force participation has been falling for both women and men (Figure 4), but the 
gender gap in the labor force participation rate (LFPR) has been increasing since 2000. 
This suggests that, while there may be common reasons for the decline in LFPR for both 
women and men, such as the preference for leisure as incomes increase, some factors may 
pertain specifically to women. As D. Yang and W. Meiyang note, the most important reason 
for the difference in LFPR between men and women is “the different roles that men and 
women play in the family and society at large,” where “85 percent of household chores are 
undertaken by women” (footnote 85, p. 11) Therefore, time constraints and gender norms 
are potentially important in explaining changing patterns of labor force participation and 
their interaction with care responsibilities.
The drop in the LFPR is substantial for women less than 54 years old. As shown in Figure 17, 
the LFPR for women 25–34 years of age was 87.3% in 2000, and this dropped to 82.8% in 
2013. One contributing factor may be women’s increasing difficulty in combining paid work 
and care work.151 Women perform the overwhelming majority of care and unpaid domestic 
work in the PRC. It is estimated that less than one-third of women in the PRC have access 
to maternity leave (footnote 82, p. 145), the proportion of women taking maternity leave 
declined and this is particularly pronounced for women without a college education,152 and 
there are no legislated provisions for paternity or parental leave (footnote 82, p. 53). The 
responsibility for childcare falls overwhelmingly on women, as mothers and grandmothers, 
and contributes to lower labor force participation. 
The decline in LFPR of women 15–24 years of age from 67.7% in 2000 to 53.9% in 2013 
is also substantial. The decline may be partly due to increased participation in education 
by women in the lower part of the age range. The drop for men, shown in Figure 17, is less 
pronounced for these age groups. It is also notable that women’s LFPR for the over-55 years 
age group shows no noticeable decline from 2000 to 2013, whereas the rate for men in the 
151 N. Jia and X. Dong. The Effect of Paid Maternity Leave on Breastfeeding Duration: Evidence from Urban China. 
Unpublished manuscript; also see footnotes 24, 35, and 95.
152 N. Jia and X. Dong. The Effect of Paid Maternity Leave on Breastfeeding Duration: Evidence from Urban China. 
Unpublished manuscript.
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Source: International Labour Organization. Key Indicators of the Labour Market. Geneva: (8th edition, Table 1a).
Figure 17: Labor Force Participation Rates  
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same age group did. This may reflect that, an earlier retirement age notwithstanding, elderly 
women do not have the income security to increasingly withdraw from the labor market in 
the same way elderly men have.153  
153 This point is also made by D. Yang and W. Meiyang (footnote 85, p.11), who state that “throughout their life cycle, 
women accumulate labor market disadvantages that pile up at older ages and are therefore more vulnerable than men 
to poverty and social exclusion.”
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The ILO cites the market transition as a further general explanatory factor of the dual 
trends of a declining female LFPR and an increasing gender gap in the LFPR. It argues that 
the transition to a more market-oriented economy “may have revived a more ‘traditional’ 
gender division of roles in household and the labour market.” The reform of the state-
owned sector, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, is also identified as a contributing factor to 
the dual trends (footnote 24, p. 8). D. Hare, examining a 2-decade decline in the labor 
force participation of married women in urban areas of the PRC, finds that growing wage 
inequality and a growing gender wage gap may discourage women’s participation, especially 
for those with low levels of education. As she puts it, “if female time is devalued in the 
workplace, women will disproportionately exit.”154 
There are multiple reasons for the decline in female LFPR and the rising LFPR gender 
gap, including the impacts of state sector restructuring, the possible impacts of the 
market transition on gender roles, the relative declining returns to women’s labor market 
participation, and increasing work–care conflict. The latter is likely to be intensified by the 
demographic transition. That is, the tensions between women’s labor force participation 
and their role as caregivers are likely to intensify over the coming decade as the full effects 
of the demographic transition are felt. 
There are good reasons to believe that the widening LFPR gender gap observed over the 
past decade will continue. In the PRC, women typically have the main responsibility for 
the care of elderly parents and parents-in-law, thereby potentially further increasing the 
conflict between unpaid care work and labor market participation for married women. 
While research on urban areas in the PRC found that caring for parents does not affect 
caregivers’ labor market participation (in employment status or hours of work), caring for 
parents-in-law has a substantial effect. In the latter case, the probability of the caregiver 
being in employment and the number of hours worked are lower.155 Taking care of parents-
in-law is estimated to reduce married women’s paid work by between 288 and 366 hours 
per year (footnote 156, p. 184). The explanation for this differential outcome is attributed 
to patrilineal care norms, meaning that husbands are likely to be more supportive of women 
reducing their employment and work hours to care for their in-laws than their own parents 
(footnote 155, pp. 175–176) (See also R. Connelly and M. Maurer-Fazio on the relevance of 
these patrilineal norms).156  
Eldercare is also found to impact on women’s earnings in the rural PRC. Although their 
decision to participate in the off-farm labor market appears to be unaffected by the 
presence of the elderly, it does decrease women’s income by 17%, as they are expected to 
care for the elderly when needed.157 Other research finds that the proportion of elders living 
alone decreases with age and health (footnote 155, p. 5), so they might be expected to 
require more care from other (typically female) household members.  
154 D. Hare. 2016. What Accounts for the Decline in Labour Force Participation Among Married Women in Urban China, 
1991–2011? China Economic Review 38. p. 263.
155 L. Liu, X. Dong, and X. Zheng. 2010. Parental Care and Married Women’s Labor Supply in Urban China. Feminist 
Economics. 16 (3). p. 172.
156 R. Connelly and M. Maurer-Fazio. 2015. Left Behind, at Risk, and Vulnerable Elders in Rural China: What the RUMIC 
Data Reveal About the Extent, Causes, and Consequences of Being Left Behind. IZA Discussion Paper. No. 9213, July.
157 F. Qiao et al. 2015. Impact of Childcare and Eldercare on Off-Farm Activities in Rural China. China & World Economy. 
23 (2). p. 115.
In the PRC, women 
typically have the main 
responsibility for the 
care of elderly parents 
and parents-in-law, 
thereby potentially 
further increasing the 
conflict between unpaid 
care work and labor 
market participation for 
married women.
Gender Equality and the Labor Market: Women, Work, and Migration in the People’s Republic of China60
Paid eldercare may also be expected to increase over time with the demographic transition, 
and to provide new employment opportunities. However, X. Dong, J. Feng, and Y. Yu found 
that domestic workers engaging in eldercare are some of the lowest paid service workers. 
Their results show that domestic eldercare workers in Shanghai receive, on average, 24% 
less pay than other workers with the same observed characteristics employed in other 
service sectors. They attribute this to three reasons. First, society places low value on 
domestic service work. Second, retirees who might purchase care have lower income than 
people in the labor force. While family support is also typically available, it is insufficient 
to supplement the low incomes of the elderly in need of care. They note that, since 
women typically outlive their husbands, it is elderly women who have the greatest need to 
purchase eldercare services and they are a low-income group. Third, 99% of the domestic 
eldercare service workers in this sample in Shanghai are women, who tend to be the most 
marginalized women (those in their 50s), and rural migrants from the poorest provinces.158 
The domestic care sector itself lacks decent work, and eldercare service providers have the 
poorest working conditions (including in remuneration and hours) within the sector.  
Figure 18 summarizes the impacts of the demographic transition on gender and work.
158 X. Dong, J. Feng, and Y. Yu. 2017. Relative Pay of Domestic Eldercare Workers in Shanghai Feminist Economics. 23 (1). 
pp. 135–159.
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Source: Author.
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7 Summary and Policy Recommendations 
The PRC is undergoing multiple transitions. The four transitions analyzed here have complex implications for gender equality and work. Using the transition framework, 
this report highlighted how each transition has gender impacts on the labor market, and 
provided evidence of areas where pervasive gender inequality remains, and areas where this 
inequality is increasing. It has shown that women are a heterogeneous group in their labor 
market participation, and that who is likely to be affected (and how they are likely to be 
affected) varies. 
The transitions often interact and may be mutually enforcing. For example, market reforms 
and gender wage discrimination interact with the demographic transition to reinforce 
gender inequality. To illustrate more fully the scope of the interactions, Table 4 lists the 
major gender issues facing the PRC’s policy-makers today, and indicates the transition 
factors contributing to these issues.
Table 4: Summary
Gender Issue Transition Factor
Increasing labor force 
participation rate gender gap
Demographic transition: Implications of care for the elderly
Market transition: Reductions in workplace and publicly provided affordable childcare
Industrial and occupational 
segregation
Market transition: Women displaced from state-owned enterprises are more 
likely to find employment in the private sector in lower-level jobs. Women are 
underrepresented as entrepreneurs, professionals, and senior managers
Development transition: Manufacturing sector employment segregation with women 
in lower-paying subsectors
Growth transition: Rise of service sector with gender segregation of workforce (often 
as a result of gender stereotyping of women in service and domestic care sectors)
Rising gender wage 
discrimination
Market transition: Expansion of the private sector led to increasing gender wage 
discrimination
Development transition: Migrant labor force growth accompanied by wage 
discrimination against women migrant workers
Informal work and decent 
work deficits
Market transition: Growth of informal sector with the reduction in importance of the 
state-owned enterprises sector
Development transition: Migrant workers’ working conditions often poor with limited 
benefits and protections
Growth transition: Services sector work often lacks benefits and protections (e.g., 
female domestic care workers) 
continued on next page
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Gender Issue Transition Factor
Migrant women workers 
as bottom-of-the-ladder 
workers
Development transition: Migrant women workers subject to higher levels of gender 
wage discrimination, dormitory labor system, and lowest levels of self-reported  
well-being
Burden on left-behind 
elderly women
Development transition: Out-migration flows increased work burdens for the left-
behind with elderly women’s work time increasing the most to compensate; effects on 
left-behind girls’ work time also noticeable
Unpaid care and domestic 
work inequity and work–
care conflict
Market transition: Lack of affordable childcare and eldercare disproportionately 
impact upon women and intensify work–care conflict. Occurring in a social context 
within which women are ascribed the role of primary domestic work and care providers
Demographic transition: Implications for unpaid care work of daughters and 
daughters-in-law
Development transition: “Harsh choices” facing female migrant women between 
providing childcare and working in a context where affordable childcare is lacking 
Source: Author.
The recommendations made in the technical report follow directly from the gender issues 
summarized above as arising from the PRC’s multiple transitions. That the transitions 
interact mean that acting to address the impacts of any one transition in isolation is unlikely 
to have the desired results. Therefore, this report argues for a broad approach to policy 
change that addresses multiple transitions. Without such policy interventions, the transition 
factors identified will lead to a further widening of gender inequality and intensification of 
the issues identified. As the PRC transitions to the “new normal,” it is important for policy 
makers to take steps to ensure that reducing gender equality is included. For this reason and 
the recent trends discussed above, the following are the recommendations:
Recommendation 1:  
Rethink the provision of care
The PRC faces a gendered care challenge, evident in the absence of sufficient publicly 
provided childcare, the absence of sufficient support for the left-behind children of 
migrant workers, and the absence of sufficient eldercare. In all cases, the burden of care 
falls on women, whether daughters, wives, or grandmothers, and deprives them of the 
opportunities and benefits of economic growth and employment. The social costs of 
migration are high and fall disproportionately on females of multiple generations.
Further, mothers and caregivers pay an additional wage penalty, which again points to 
the need for better and more equitable provision of care to ensure caregiving is not 
accompanied by a wage gap. This requires specific policy interventions such as job-
protected maternity leave of adequate duration, flexible working arrangements for all 
workers, the availability and affordability of quality childcare, improvement in care services 
for the elderly, and preventing and eliminating discrimination based on maternity and family 
responsibilities. Employers also have reason to find workplace solutions to reducing work 
time and care conflict, and this could be facilitated by providing greater mechanisms for 
voice for women in the workplace.
Table 4 continued
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If gender equality is to be achieved, the way in which care, in its multiple forms and life-
cycle dimensions from early childhood to old age, needs to be rethought to ensure it is 
more equally divided between the sexes, and its burden on women is lessened through 
other forms of provision. Increased social expenditure will be required to address this in 
both rural and urban areas. More broadly, systematically addressing the reprovisioning of 
care work will require the active participation of governments at all levels, social agencies, 
and employers, as well as changing social norms. This will partly require public expenditure 
changes, a process that could be facilitated by gender budgeting approaches and tools. 
Employers bear a responsibility, too, and the family responsibilities of workers need to be 
accommodated within the workplace. It will also require continued education campaigns to 
change social norms related to the equal sharing of care work by women and men.
Recommendation 2:  
Adopt measures to address gender 
segregation in the labor force
The PRC’s labor market is characterized by significant industrial segregation by sex, with 
women disproportionately represented in the lower-paying sectors. There is also evidence 
of occupational segregation, with women less likely to advance within the ranks of an 
occupation. Increasing women’s education levels and closing the education gender gap 
may decrease this segregation in the longer term. Even with this, though, the differences 
between the quality of education in rural and urban areas need to be addressed. However, 
education alone is unlikely to eliminate the problem, and more needs to be done to 
break down the social constructions of men’s and women’s work. Training and vocational 
programs for girls in all fields will also be required.
Gender-neutral job advertisements are becoming more common, and this process should 
be encouraged or legislated. Hiring quotas in the professions may have a similar effect, as 
would gender quotas for senior management and board positions.
A gender-neutral retirement policy may enable women to advance into more senior 
positions and enable them to retire with levels of savings more comparable with men’s, 
providing that complementary polices are also enacted to enable women to earn as much 
as men when working. 
Women are underrepresented as entrepreneurs and face barriers to advancement. Short-
term measures such as increasing the credit available to women in self-employment and 
to women entrepreneurs may enable those women to advance their relative positions. 
Given the importance of social networks to women entrepreneurs, support for women’s 
associations could be expanded in scope both geographically and functionally, and include 
the ability to promote women entrepreneurs’ access to credit and market information, as 
well as to role models. International evidence also supports the potential role that women’s 
networks can play in promoting female entrepreneurship (footnote 82, p. 8).
New policies to support entrepreneurship among returning migrants need to be assessed 
for gender-equitable accessibility. This should form part of a wider evaluation of existing 
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measures to see if these are meeting the needs of women entrepreneurs, especially in 
rural areas. Particular attention should be paid to whether a clustering of services (such 
as finance, business training, and ongoing technical assistance) is more effective than 
single focus program interventions, as is suggested by evidence from other countries 
(footnote 82).  
However, in the longer term, the gendered society needs to be challenged and the 
fundamental equality of both sexes ingrained in social norms and practice through greater 
public education.
Recommendation 3:  
Address gender wage discrimination
Gender wage discrimination is significant and increasing. This suggests that, while the PRC 
has ratified the international convention on Equal Remuneration (C100), much remains 
to be done in practice. Mechanisms for the workplace evaluation of job competencies 
to ensure that work of equal value is remunerated equally is a widely used method to 
address gender wage discrimination, and could be implemented in the PRC’s workplaces; 
for example, in the care economy. Reducing income inequality is a key aim of the PRC’s 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), and it is crucial to include a gender dimension. 
Recommendation 4:  
Expand social and labor protection for 
workers that will benefit women
Women are employed in some of the most vulnerable sectors, and an expansion of 
protection would be of substantial benefit to them. Such protections may be legal,  
such as the enforcement of the New Labor Contract Law, which has been expanded to 
include all sectors where many women, such as domestic service workers, are employed but 
do not currently qualify as employees. The enforcement of the New Labor Contract Law 
has been beneficial in increasing protection for workers and enabling them to access more 
social insurance benefits. Stricter enforcement will benefit women, especially rural and 
migrant women workers. 
Such protections may also be economic, in expanding the ability of workers to access social 
protection schemes, an especially important area for women migrant workers. 
Relaxing the hukou system to allow migrant workers to access urban services including 
health, education, childcare, and other social services will also benefit migrant women.
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Ensuring complete workplace protection coverage for all workers is critical, and will benefit 
marginalized women workers. This is a matter of expansion in some cases, such as the 
Labour Contract Law and social protection measures, and enforcement in others, such 
as mechanisms pertaining to working time and overtime pay. Mechanisms for increasing 
women’s voices are also an essential part of such a policy initiative.
Recommendation 5:  
Systematically collect and publish  
sex-disaggregated data and undertake 
specific research studies to address gaps  
in the literature
The findings in this report demonstrate that there are clear gender dimensions to labor 
market processes and outcomes, and in social provision. However, statistical data sources 
often preclude an examination by sex, since these are not presented in ways that allow such 
analysis to take place. Evidence-based policy requires sound data sources, and increasing 
the scope of sex-disaggregated data in national statistics, including for migrant workers in 
the Annual Survey of Migrants, would be beneficial.
This report also identified gaps in the literature, and areas where studies from a gender 
perspective would be useful. These include studies on:
(i) barriers to entrepreneurship, including (a) the implementation and workings  
of the “back to the countryside” program for returning migrant entrepreneurs; and 
(b) government small business strategy, and a selection of civil society organization 
projects (e.g., Asia Foundation and Goldman Sachs);
(ii) how women, whether as contract farmers, traders, or employees, are affected 
by the new agribusiness conglomerates; that is, who is being linked with these 
new firms and by what methods, and who are the main beneficiaries, need to be 
analyzed from a gender perspective;
(iii) the gender unemployment gap for the most highly educated workers;
(iv) the barriers to women’s employment as managers and professionals; 
(v) the growth of the “informal sector,” including the care sector, and working 
conditions in it;
(vi) the occupational mobility of first- and second-generation female migrant workers;
(vii) the housing conditions, transportation, and safety of non-dormitory female 
migrant workers;
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(viii) the gender bias in social insurance participation, obtaining written contracts, 
union membership, and mental health of migrant workers, and how changes in the 
institutional design of policies can improve gender equity;
(ix) the contributions of, and challenges experienced by, civil society organizations 
in effectively meeting women’s labor market interests and achieving changes in 
policies and regulations; and 
(x) the impacts of factory relocation to lower-wage countries and technological 
upgrading on women’s employment in the PRC.
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Appendix: Relationship between 
Share of Women Employed by the 
Industrial Sector and Average Wage 
in the Sector, Urban Units, 2013
Note: The industrial sectors are selected from those employing more than 1 million women workers.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 2014. China 
Labour Statistical Yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press (Table 3-1).
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